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 This study examines how the new urban economy has transformed the structures 
that impact individual earnings opportunities across place. Using data from the 1990 and 
2000 Census, this study is based on two multi-level data sets, each reporting 
characteristics for approximately 1 million individuals nested within more than 200 
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs). This study examines how inequality varies across 
MSAs in the US. Associations between MSA-level characteristics, including proportion 
of employment in new economy sectors, earnings, educational attainment, and inequality, 
are tested. Strong evidence is found demonstrating strong and statistically significant 
correlations between new economy indicators and MSA-level inequality, which is 
measured through an MSA-level Gini index and an earnings ratio. In the last portion of 
the study, hierarchical linear modeling, which makes it possible to test and control for 
cross-level interactions, is used to examine how these indicators shape individual 
earnings across place. 
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Over the last few decades, the growth of the new urban economy has re-shaped 
cities and individual work opportunities across the US. By the new urban economy, I am 
referring to economic sectors rooted in human capital, and including what is referred to 
as creative or innovative work, as well as high-technology industries. The rise of the new 
urban economy has transformed some metropolitan regions and been associated with 
growth in high-earning job opportunities for skilled and talented workers. The rise of the 
new urban economy has also re-emphasized the importance of social structures in 
determining individual earnings opportunities, including place and inequality. While 
many scholars have investigated the rise of the new urban economy, few have done so 
with a precise focus on inequality and individual earnings. This study works to bring a 
systematic analysis of the how the structures of the new urban economy shape individual 
opportunities using a large sample data set. 
In this new urban economy, characteristics of place have a renewed importance 
for workers in that place. Despite prognostications that advances in communication 
technology and the sustained forces of globalization would render a person’s location 
irrelevant to their work, it is instead becoming more important factor. Cities are now 
popularly seen as defining institutions in the modern economy (Sassen, 2001, 2012; 
Glaeser, 2011; Moretti, 2012). We are coming to understand that in this new urban 
economy, place is an increasingly important social structure which shapes individual 
opportunities. As such, the ability to be geographically mobile also plays a role in an 
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individual’s opportunities, and the rates of geographically mobile works in a region’s 
labor force can be expected to have an impact on that region’s economy as well.  
 Concurrent with the rise of the new urban economy has been increased social 
stratification and inequality. Being stuck in places with few stable job opportunities has 
become normal for many U.S. workers (Hamer, 2011; Carr and Kefalas, 2009; Wilson 
1987 and 1996). After decades of gradually increasing inequality, the dramatic recession 
of 2008 spurred a greater social consciousness about social inequality. In scholarship and 
academia, people are returning to the issue of inequality and social class.  
 As the son of a steel mill worker growing up in western Pennsylvania, I 
recognized early on how structural changes operating through place (such as industrial 
disinvestment) can dramatically alter the work opportunities available to local residents. I 
have watched with both scholarly and personal interest as the rise of the new urban 
economy has re-shaped many metropolitan regions. Some cities have seen massive 
growth, at least in some industries, while others have continued to languish after 
deindustrialization. Workers, like my friends and even me, must quickly adapt to this 
changing landscape in order to find the best opportunities for themselves. 
 This study works to assess how the new urban economy has reshaped the 
landscape of opportunity. New patterns of inequality which impact individuals but take 
shape across metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) will be described and assessed. Then 
associations between characteristics of metropolitan regions will be studied to see what 
characteristics of MSAs are associated with rates of employment in new economy sectors 
in these regions and the nature of inequality in those regions. Finally, the role of the 
metropolitan region in shaping an individual’s earnings opportunities will be examined 
through a multi-level statistical analysis. 
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 This study works to describe and analyze how the new urban economy has re-
shaped earnings opportunities across all US metropolitan regions. Chapter 2 will outline 
the theoretical framework guiding this study. Chapter 3 delineates the data and methods 
used in this investigation. Chapter 4 describes the landscape of inequality across US 
metropolitan regions, answering several descriptive questions that emerge from the 
literature. Chapter 5 tests several hypotheses that are extracted from the relevant literature 
which tests associations among MSA-level characteristics. In Chapter 6, several multi-
level models are specified which examine how an individual’s earnings are impacted by 
the social structure of their metropolitan region. Chapter 7 summarizes and reflects on the 
results of this investigation.
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CHAPTER 2 
THE NEW URBAN ECONOMY:  
INEQUALITY AND PLACE IN A POST-INDUSTRIAL ECONOMY 
 
As Mills (1959) wrote, the “first fruit” of the sociological imagination is the idea 
that “the individual can understand his own experience and gauge his own fate only by 
locating himself within his period, that he can know his own chance in life only by 
becoming aware of those of all individuals in his circumstances” (22). Individuals can 
understand their situation, the prospects available to them, by using a sociological 
imagination to perceive and understand how social structures shape their opportunities. 
For workers in the U.S., the last few decades have been marked by major economic 
tumults and dramatic shifts in the economic landscape. These shifts may be summarized 
through three major trends. Each of these three have interacted in re-shaping labor market 
structures in US metropolitan regions and earnings opportunities for individuals in those 
labor markets. 
The first major trend is the rise of the new urban economy. Much of the economic 
growth experienced in the last few decades has been based in industries and occupations 
in the new urban economy. Sometimes referred to as the “knowledge economy,” the 
“innovative economy,” or the “creative economy,” growth in these jobs has been the 
defining characteristic of economic growth in the US, and a popular topic among a range 
of scholars (Florida 2002, 2003, 2012; Nevarez 2003; Sassen 2012; and Moretti 2012). 
Much of the related scholarship focuses primarily on the economic “winners” without 
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giving due consideration to transformations taking place throughout labor markets. To 
understand the trend of the rise of the new urban economy, one must understand two 
aspects of this new economic growth. First, this growth has emerged from innovation and 
creativity, and so has a foundation in human capital. Second, this growth is also 
characterized by a distinctly urban component in the places or locations in which this 
innovative growth has emerged is also understood as vitally important to the growth.  
The second major trend is the renewed importance of place as a factor in 
economic opportunity. Many social commentators anticipated that processes of 
globalization and the continued development and use of communication technology 
would cause place to become an irrelevant factor in the modern economy, but in this new 
urban economy, the opposite has proven true. During the early portion of the rise of thew 
new urban economy, Clarke and Gaile (1998) noticed, for cities, globalization meant that, 
“city roles and functions are changing dramatically and taking on greater importance” 
(3). The metropolitan region in which a person is working has proven to be an 
increasingly important social structure in shaping an individual’s opportunities. 
Meanwhile, investors, technology firms small and large, and city leaders are recognizing 
that cities and urban regions are competing to attract the most talented workforce in the 
hopes of acquiring a critical density to generate the next great innovation.  
The third major trend, the continued increase in stratification and inequality, is in 
some ways a consequence of the first two. Over the last several decades, the US has seen 
a widening of social stratification and increased inequality (Massey 2007). A simmering 
issue for years, the recession of 2008 aroused concerns about unemployment and the 
Occupy protests stimulated public discussion of the widening gap in wealth between the 
top one percent and the rest of the country. But, even when considering only those who 
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are employed and considering only their wage and salary earnings, inequality has 
increased over the last several decades. As this study will demonstrate, this inequality is 
in large part driven by an increasingly divided labor market in which a some skilled 
worker are gainfully employed while many others struggle to earn a livable wage. 
These trends have generated substantial academic consideration. This scholarship, 
though, often focuses on only one or two of these three trends, rather than considering all 
of them together. This study examines the simultaneous impact of each of these three 
trends on workers across US MSA’s. Through this examination, I will establish a 
systematic analysis of how these processes have altered the landscape of inequality for 
workers in the US, creating a more uneven geography of opportunity. Below I will 
consider each of these trends in more detail along with relevant scholarship that has 
worked to understand these trends. From these considerations descriptive questions and 
hypotheses which will form the basis of this investigation will emerge. 
2.1 THE NEW URBAN ECONOMY 
The first major economic force shaping regional economies in the US has been 
the growth around human capital-dependent industries and occupations, understood here 
as the new urban economy. Scholars studying these processes refer to it in a variety of 
ways – the knowledge economy, the post-industrial economy, the innovative economy, 
the creative economy – but I will refer to scholarship on this subject as scholarship of the 
new urban economy. Several scholars have contributed to this area of research from a 
variety of angles.  
Allen (2006) recognizes that scholars have made several attempts to assess the 
essential features of the new economic order, stating that the new economy has been 
“variously evoked in terms of postindustrial society (Bell 1973), flexible accumulation 
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(Harvey 1987), and postfordism (Albertsen 1988), among other labels, although none of 
them is entirely satisfactory” (3). Nevarez (2003) explains that by the 1980s the “new 
economy” referred to “disarmament, industrial disinvestment, services” (15). Nevarez 
(2003) argues that the primary sectors of the new economy (tourism, entertainment, 
technology) are responsive to much different incentives than those offered by the 
traditional growth machine. One important difference Nevarez (2003) notes is that 
because technology companies are dependent on elite, talented workers, these firms are 
more interested in locating in areas that provide lifestyle incentives to potential 
employees, than they are interested in local tax breaks or other incentives of more 
traditional firms (56). The work of Clark et al. (2002) confirms this argument, as they 
contend that the presence of cultural amenities function as a major driver of economic 
growth within American cities. Hyra (2008) and Lloyd’s (2005) works also underscore 
the role of art and culture in neighborhood change and gentrification. Nevarez (2003) 
argues that the particular locations which appeal to knowledge-economy workers will 
host growing clusters of workers around particular specialized industries.  
In this milieu, Richard Florida’s creative class paradigm provided a succinct and 
catchy means to summarize these patterns. While his work has generated heated critiques, 
the work has also been one of the most influential in understanding these new processes. 
Florida’s The Rise of the Creative Class (RCC) was released in 2002, followed by a 2003 
article in City and Community. Briefly, the creative class paradigm argues that people 
whose work relies on creativity, from architects to musicians to professors, are the 
economic and cultural drivers of modern metropolitan regions. Not only does their 
creative work stimulate economic growth, but also their preferences for a tolerant 
community and convenient cultural amenities have the ability to transform 
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neighborhoods. Because their talents are specialized and rare, cities do well to work to 
attract the creative class. While creative work often demands high earnings, the amenity 
preferences of this class stimulate growth in less stable, and less well-paying service jobs. 
This leads to an as-yet underappreciated pattern of widening earnings inequality. 
Florida (2002) argues that the creative class is an economic class along the lines 
that Weeden and Grusky (2005) might refer to as a “stylized measure” of social class 
because it aggregates detailed occupational categories into a large class category. Florida 
(2002) explains that the operationalization of the creative class is a relatively simple 
aggregation of occupational codes from the standard occupational classification system 
(68, 73). Florida then distinguished between those individuals who form the core of the 
creative class, who are the most creative in their work, and a periphery. The core is 
comprised of individuals who “create new ideas, new technology and/or new creative 
content,” such as architects or musicians (8). Members of the periphery are labeled 
“creative professionals” and include individuals whose work engages “in complex 
problem solving that involves a great deal of independent judgment and requires high 
levels of education or human capital,” (8) including, for example, many individuals who 
work in finance or health care. With this operational definition, Florida found that about 
38 million Americans, or about 30 % of all employed workers, were members of the 
creative class in 2002 (8). 
The definition of the creative class, in contrast to the operationalization, is more 
complex and theoretical. Florida (2002) defines the creative class as people who “add 
economic value through their creativity” in their work which creates new ideas, 
technologies, and content (68). Florida distinguishes the creative class from what he 
labels the working and service classes, which again are based on groupings of detailed 
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occupations. Florida (2002) argues that the creative class has grown as a proportion of the 
employed workforce over the past several decades, and it commands the highest wages, 
compared to the two other large class categories he considers.  
Of course, social class concepts provide a popular lens through which sociologists 
examine social inequality (Wright, 1982; Grusky and Sorensen, 1998; Weeden and 
Grusky, 2005). Many sociological scholars are not satisfied with Florida’s 
conceptualization of class this paradigm (Reese, Faist, and Sands, 2010). Florida’s class 
concept does provide one way to make sense of a new pattern—that the cities with the 
most robust local economies—those experiencing the most growth--seem to be 
simultaneously experiencing widening inequality. For Florida, the creative class is about 
much more than a social class ranking. Members of the creative class share a culture 
based on the members’ desire to be creative and their place in the economy. In this sense, 
the creative class definition relates to Weber’s (1946) concept of status as creative class 
members interact in their social worlds through shared cultural preferences. This suggests 
that the creative class moves beyond occupations and even financial consideration to 
include non-economic characteristics, such as cultural preferences like tolerance of 
diversity, and patterns of interaction including professional networking. Whether in the 
core or periphery, Florida argues that “All members of the Creative Class – whether they 
are artists or engineers, musicians or computer scientists, writers or entrepreneurs – share 
a common creative ethos that values creativity, individuality, difference, and merit” (8). 
As he states, their “social and cultural preferences, consumption and buying habits, and 
their social identities all flow from this” (68). In this sense, the creative class develops 
and relies on a sort of capital which relates to Bourdieu’s cultural capital (Kingston, 
2001; Dumais, 2002).  
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Studies examining the influence of the creative class as an economic force have 
dominated urban literature for nearly a decade since Florida’s (2002, 2003) work 
delineating his creative class thesis was published (Allen, 2006; Scott, 2006; Evans, 
2009; Reese, Faist, and Sands, 2010). For example, Ponzini and Rossi (2010) 
demonstrate that localities are aware of and strive to become a “creative city,” an effort 
which can alter the urban regeneration process. They (2010) suggest this results in a 
neglect of the “classic goals of socio-spatial justice,” as cities cater to the creative class 
and disregard goals of improved opportunity for all residents. 
In the decade since the publication of the first book, Florida has released a 
handful of books based on the same core ideas. Florida has also produced some peer 
reviewed and co-authored research (Florida, Mellander, Stolarick, 2008). More recently, 
he has become an editor at Atlantic Cities, releasing frequent snapshots of work exploring 
his perspective on cities and the Creative Class. 
Florida’s work has been criticized from a variety of angles. Hoyman and Faricy 
(2009) note several assessments of the creative class thesis, many of which critique the 
broader arguments on which the paradigm is based. For example, Peck’s (2005) work 
underscores the circular reasoning in the theoretical logic of the creative class thesis. 
Essentially, Peck critiques Florida for arguing that growth attracts creative class 
members, who then cause growth, which then attracts creative class members (757). 
Other criticisms focused on methodology, interrogating the paradigm’s claims about the 
strength of the relationship between creative class presence and economic growth 
(Montgomery, 2005; Rausch and Negrey, 2006; Reese, Faist, and Sands, 2010). Scott 
(2006) acknowledges that several “historically specific forms of the creative city seem to 
be on the rise,” but Scott contends that Florida fails to “articulate the necessary and 
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sufficient conditions under which skilled, qualified, and creative individuals will actually 
congregate together in particular places and remain there” (2006: 11).  
 Another strong critique comes from Markusen (2006), and reflects Milligan’s 
(2002) call for a more interactionist approach. Interrogating the interaction of creative 
class members, Markusen (2006) argues that the workers which fall into the creative class 
classification lack any sense of group identity. This relates to another critique, from 
Markusen (2006) and others, which refer back to human capital theory and suggest that 
education is often a more simple and obvious indicator of the new economy than any 
creativity marker.  
Another example of critiques of Florida’s methods is Rausch and Negrey’s (2006) 
effort to test the usefulness of Florida’s indicators. Their work replicates Florida’s (2002) 
creativity index and then implements this index in regression analyses of MSA’s 
economic development. They find, however, that when controlling for other relevant 
factors, high technology and educational attainment are more important factors in 
economic development or urban places. They state, “it does not appear that merely 
adding creative class individuals in an MSA will lead to a stronger economy” (482). 
Hoyman and Faricy’s (2009) also tested the creative class and human and social capital 
models of economic growth among 276 metropolitan statistical areas. Employing the 
same index for the creative class, they found no supporting evidence for the argument 
that the creative class is related to growth. Both of these studies, of course, directly 
contradict Florida’s repeated argument that the creative class drives the modern urban 
economy.  
A more recent investigation of methodological problems in the creative class 
thesis is the work of Reese, Faist, and Sands (2010). The authors argue that the growing 
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creative class literature has provided “little overall sense of relative validity” because it 
has employed a diversity of methods, from analysis of census data to interviews with 
business leaders. While bringing a diversity of methods to a research problem could be a 
strength and not a weakness, their comment on the “validity” of the findings in this 
paradigm underscore the lack of systemization of the theory, and the appearance that 
proponents selectively choose data for its supportiveness of the paradigm.  
Working to refine and systematize understanding in this paradigm, Reese, Faist, 
and Sands (2010) then set out to test four measures of the creative class, comparing them 
for “consistency and reliability” but they produced mixed results (346). The problem is 
that each of these measures are more adjacent to than in line with the aggregated 
occupation codes Florida uses to define the creative class. In the end, these authors fall 
back on an “admittedly subjective (but reasonably consistent)” assessment based on their 
own visits to several of the downtown areas in the cities they studied to assert that their 
downtown quality index, the creative class index (based on Census occupational 
classifications), and the location of university employees are the best for identifying the 
metropolitan areas which would be most desirable to creative class members (360). They 
conclude that measures of entertainment and cultural amenities are better, though not 
perfect, indicators of the creative class in a region than high-tech employment, but 
acknowledge that this “says nothing about the usefulness of either indicator in designing 
policies to attract creative class individuals” (359).  
In working to refine measures and arguments in the creative class paradigm, many 
scholars, then, have found mixed results. The paradigm remains compelling, but there 
remains a need for continued refinement of the definition of concepts, use of indicators, 
and the overall model of economic growth. Perhaps the problem is that the paradigm is 
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motivated by an effort to predict economic growth, rather than assess the drivers of 
economic growth accurately. These critiques suggest then that education may be a 
simpler, but not necessarily better, indicator of the new economy, and the creative class 
does not necessarily correlate with a strong regional economy. As a social class schema, 
the creative class may not be a satisfactory for many sociologists, but as an indicator of 
the new economy, the creative class proves very useful. But, as this study will 
demonstrate, Florida’s original definition of the creative class is a powerful indicator of 
the new economy, if not regional economic well-being. While the creative class paradigm 
has faced substantial criticism, it remains a popular paradigm among policymakers and 
urban planners, it continues to stimulate new research, and it proven to be one of the 
clearest indicators of the new economy (Evans, 2009).  
While each of these criticisms has merit, Florida has also responded. For example, 
to the critique that it is basically a more complex way of measuring individuals with a 
college degree he notes that the creative class and those with a college degree are 
substantially different groups, both in membership and in their effect on their city’s 
economy. He argues that, in the U.S., more than a quarter of those with a college degree 
are not in the creative class and refers to Stolarick and Currid-Halkett’s (2012) analysis, 
which found that just less than 60 percent of the creative class have a college degree (40). 
Florida (2012) also refers to Gabe’s (2011) study, which demonstrated that the creative 
class has a substantial effect on regional economic growth, an impact separate from 
educational attainment alone. 
I think the major problem with Florida’s work is that he concluded that the 
creative class causes new economy growth, rather than that the two are simply 
correlated. This leads to the circularity of his early arguments and was the foundation of 
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his oversimplified prescriptive policy recommendation that cities focus on attracting the 
creative class without fully considering what investment in such efforts would mean for 
the entirety of a region’s economy. While Florida has spent a decade convincing 
localities to invest in attracting the creative class, other scholars have recognized that 
solutions to regional problems are likely not so simple. As Clarke and Gaile (1998) 
explained a handful of years before Florida’s first work on the creative class, “Cities vary 
on so many salient dimensions … that it is unrealistic to search for one best solution” (9). 
His contention that cities should invest in attracting the creative class may be a good 
policy recommendation for some cities, but not for all, and it certainly does little more 
than tell cities that they should emulate the cities that are doing well. The creative class 
can be a useful indicator of the new economy without it implying that the best policy for 
every urban region is to invest in attracting the creative class. In his more recent work, 
Florida has come around to a similar conclusion, giving greater consideration to 
understanding how the creative economy shapes opportunities for workers beyond the 
creative class. This leads to some very interesting findings, as we will see below in the 
section on inequality. 
What Florida’s work on the creative class does do well is summarize many of the 
processes at play in the new urban economy. And while the creative class paradigm is a 
decade old, this new economy is still of vital interest to urban scholars. Moretti’s (2012) 
work outlines many of the same patterns, but focuses on “innovation” rather than 
creativity. Scholarship which works to better understand the impact of the major 
processes association with the new urban economy is still needed. The major processes 
include that human capital, however defined, plays a major role in this new economy. 
Agglomeration of skilled workers in innovative industries encourages economic growth 
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(Florida, 2002, Nevarez, 2003, Moretti, 2012). The uneven geographic dispersal of 
agglomeration of talent makes place a more important factor. Finally, the cultural 
amenities available in these places interact with the lifestyle of these skilled workers in 
re-shaping place character (Paulsen, 2004). These processes have particular implications 
for the relevance of place and the nature of stratification and inequality. Each of these 
issues will be considered in the following sections. The scholarship that this new urban 
economy literature has generated has mostly focused on determining which cities are 
growing and which factors (usually education, creativity, or innovation) are most 
associated with that growth. This study, though, will examine what these processes have 
meant for stratification and inequality in the U.S., and how individual workers across all 
job types are impacted by these processes through the region in which they work. At the 
end of this chapter I will develop several descriptive questions and testable hypotheses 
which will be used throughout this study to examine this new urban economy more 
thoroughly.  
2.2 THE ROLE OF PLACE IN THE NEW URBAN ECONOMY 
The second major trend is that the growth of the new economy has occurred 
unevenly across the US. As Harvey wrote in 2006, “There is nothing new, of course, 
about uneven geographical development” (71). What is noteworthy is that this uneven 
development has been exacerbated by the new urban economy, rather than the forces of 
globalization making place less important. As a result, individuals have experienced these 
upheavals through their location, often as a regional phenomenon. From the 1970’s and 
continuing through these decades, some communities, particularly those in the rust belt, 
saw much of their manufacturing base disappear, completely reshaping the economic 
opportunities available to local workers. These communities often saw tremendous 
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population loss and in these regions concerns about a “brain drain,” or exodus of young 
skilled workers, persist. Meanwhile other regions have witnessed tremendous economic 
growth around new economy sectors.  
At the heart of urban sociology is the recognition that place matters and over the 
past decade, as urban sociologists have worked to understand the changing landscape of 
work in the modern economy, place has risen to primary importance. Like class, race, or 
gender, place is a social structure that shapes the opportunities available to those who live 
and work in any particular location. Several characteristics about a place may affect an 
individual’s earnings opportunities within that place. The extent of deindustrialization, 
the proportion of individuals with a bachelor’s degree, and many other attributes of a 
place may shape an individual’s opportunities in addition to their own individual 
attributes.  
Many scholars have investigated place as a social structure, interrogating how 
uneven opportunities across places shapes individual opportunity. Logan and Molotch 
(1987) recognized that cities “are highly unequal in the life chances they offer residents,” 
and that “inequality among places persists in radical degree” (xi). Place structures social 
relations, as Tickamyer (2000) argues that a particular place can be understood as “a set 
of causal factors that shape social structure and process” (806). As Tickamyer (2000) 
elaborates, “Spatial arrangements are both products and sources of other forms of 
inequality” (806). Massey (2007) writes that social boundaries are made to conform to 
geographic boundaries “through a systematic process of segregation.” With his focus on 
inequality, he elaborates on the pivotal role of place in shaping stratification in the US, 
writing that “spatial segregation renders stratification easy, convenient, and efficient 
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because simply by investing or disinvesting in a place, one can invest or disinvest in a 
whole set of people” (19).  
The shifts in the opportunities available to local workers in regions have been 
accompanied by changes in the perceptions of the place character, or economic identity, 
of these regions. Cities like San Francisco, Austin, and Raleigh emerged as trendy, hip, 
and prosperous (Florida, 2002; Moretti, 2012). Perceptions of place character can play a 
major role in a city (Paulsen, 2004). As Tickameyer (2000) notes, place can be 
understood as “an identifiable territorial manifestation of social relations and practices 
that define that particular setting” (806). These cities became even more appealing to the 
most talented workers who were willing and able to relocate. From the work of Florida 
(2002) and Moretti (2012), we know that regions now compete for talent as drivers of the 
economy. For cities which experienced substantial disinvestment, such as Detroit, the 
ability to maintain a critical mass of talented workers became even more difficult. In such 
a setting, a workers location, and their ability to be geographic mobile, becomes an even 
more important factor in determining that individual’s occupational opportunities. 
The regional level, or the level of the MSA has been a common level at which to 
study how place can differentially shape opportunities for those in the local labor market. 
South and Xu (1990) argue that the particular industry which dominates an MSA will 
impact earnings attainment in each MSA. Using data from the 1980 Census and the 125 
largest SMSA’s they found a significant effect on earnings of economic sector and local 
sectoral dominance. Workers in core and state sectors earned 43% more than those in the 
periphery, and the dominance of a worker’s sector in the local economy adds 
significantly to their earnings. Lorence (1991) examined how changing gender inequality 
was associated with changing levels of service sector employment at the MSA-level and 
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concluded that “factors other than personal characteristics,” particularly characteristics of 
MSA’s, shape gender earnings inequality (764).  
Cohen and Huffman (2003) and Huffman and Cohen (2004) have examined 
inequality at the MSA-level, employing such hierarchical linear modeling techniques. In 
the 2003 piece, the authors examine gender inequality and the female dominance of 
particular kinds of jobs. In the 2004 piece, they investigate racial wage inequality, 
studying the impacts of “black concentration” effects within labor markets. The models 
used in both of these pieces were built on the “jobs” variable. To implement this variable, 
the authors created the jobs level, which they situate between the individual and the 
MSA, and which is a combination of the Census industry and occupation categories, as 
well as the individual’s MSA. According to this construction, a secretary in the mining 
industry in Pittsburgh, PA has a different job than a secretary in the mining industry in 
Charleston, WV place was is considered as important of a factor in a job as the industry 
and occupation. Place, then, becomes a dominant aspect of these author’s investigations. 
“Jobs” as operationalized in these studies are defined equally by the occupational 
category, industry category, and MSA in which the individual works. 
Logan and Molotch (1987) anticipated that regions would differentially struggle 
to “deal effectively” in the new economy result in “uneven” growth with some MSA’s 
attracting large amounts of growth, and other struggling (258). Pais’ (2010) study of data 
from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth found that geographic and occupational 
factors in combination contribute to earnings variations to the same extent as traditional 
individual-level control variables. Other scholars also found that characteristics of place 
play important roles in shaping a worker’s opportunities. Bozick’s (2009) research based 
on a nationally representative sample of high-school graduates found that youth have 
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higher odds of entering the work force in areas with low unemployment and sufficient job 
opportunities which do not require a bachelor’s degree. Conversely, youth in areas with 
higher unemployment and fewer jobs with low education requirements are more likely to 
enter college.  
Reviewing this literature, then, we see that place has been a component of studies 
of occupational mobility, earnings, and stratification and inequality, throughout the last 
several decades. MSA’s have been used as the appropriate scale with which to investigate 
dynamics driving earnings outcomes and earnings inequalities. The most recent research 
in urban sociology, which investigates dynamics of the new economy as shaping, or the 
creative class as drivers of, post-industrial economic growth, demonstrates that in the new 
urban economy, place is an even more important factor.  
Of course, if place shapes a worker’s opportunity, then their ability to move, their 
geographic mobility is also an important factor. Examining the geographic mobility of 
workers is not a new idea. In their foundational work on occupational mobility, Blau and 
Duncan (1967) focused particular attention on geographic mobility as an important aspect 
of occupational mobility. As they framed the discussion, geographic mobility is a 
mechanism by which workers’ skills are re-matched with the geographical distribution of 
occupational opportunities. They argued that the necessity of geographic mobility results 
from “differences in economic and industrial developments among communities” (243).  
As modern urban sociologists would agree, Blau and Duncan (1967) do find that 
“A man’s economic chances are improved by his motility”, which is defined as his 
freedom to relocate in search of new work opportunities. They recognize that both 
psychological attachments and economic limitations may restrict an individual’s motility. 
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Their evidence, however, shows that geographic movement is positively associated with 
greater occupational mobility “regardless of place of birth or destination” (250).  
Recognizing that location means the presence or absence of job opportunities, 
workers across the U.S. have realized that relocation may offer their best chance at stable 
earnings and occupational mobility. Kilborn’s (2009) work examining “relovilles,” or 
neighborhoods built primarily to temporarily house families of mid-level managers 
demonstrates that these forces involve professionals as well as the working class. As the 
impacts of deindustrialization were becoming clearer in the mid-1980s, Frey (1987) 
examined the subsequent population shifts using population projections from census data. 
He found support for the deconcentration perspective, which anticipated a “pervasive 
diffusion of population associated with increasing locational flexibility of employers and 
residents” (240). This view expected depopulation of large MSA’s with growth in 
relatively smaller areas. This was attributed to “consumer locational preferences and their 
interaction with employment location decisions” – an argument that corresponds with 
Florida (2002) and Nevarez (2003) view of geographically mobile skilled workers 
searching for the best locations in which they may leverage their talent for wages. 
One limit on a worker’s geographic mobility is their access to resources, and 
during an economic downturn such resources often run short. Frey’s (2009) research 
found that during the recession of 2007-2009, the U.S. migration rate had dropped to its 
lowest point since World War II. Where migration did occur, suggests much about where 
opportunities are available. The MSA’s which experienced the highest out-migration 
were those that grew the fastest a few years earlier during the housing bubble. 
Concurrently, many MSA’s in northern areas which had been experiencing continued 
population loss saw their population loss slow or even stop. Reflecting on these patterns 
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Frey (2009) anticipates that once an economic recovery is underway, “both Sun Belt and 
Snow Belt areas with diversified, new economy industries could find themselves at the 
leading edge of the next migration boom” (1). 
Recognizing this trend of the increasing importance of place in the new urban 
economy, the overall expectation is that place and geographic mobility will continue to 
become more important to the individual worker. As those workers navigate decisions 
about occupational opportunities in regions across the U.S., a variety of MSA-level 
characteristics are at play in determining the local and opportunity structures and 
stratification patterns they encounter. This study, then, expects that workers who have 
been geographically mobile are expected to have greater earnings than those who have 
not. Furthermore, this difference should become greater over time, with the gap growing 
each decade.  
2.3 INEQUALITY IN THE NEW URBAN ECONOMY 
The landscape of job opportunities and earnings inequality across the U.S. then, is 
largely being shaped by the forces of this new, creative economy. With Massey (2007) 
finding that education has become an increasingly important predictor of earnings, and 
gender and race receding in importance, one might expect that earnings will have become 
more equal overtime as stratification is reduced. The opposite seems to be the case, 
however. Combined with continued deindustrialization and the loss of manufacturing 
jobs, the growth of the new economy is associated with earnings inequality increasing 
over the past few decades. Moretti (2012) argues that “American communities are 
desegregating racially, they are becoming more segregated in terms of schooling and 
earnings” (4). Smeeding (2005) demonstrates that by 2005, that among OECD nations, 




 percentile income distribution.  
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 The new urban economy is characterized by increases in two kinds of inequality: 
inequality between places and inequality within places. Inequality between places is 
driven by uneven growth in the new economy across places. As some cities have seen 
investment and growth in new economy sectors, while other areas have lagged behind, 
inequality between these places has expanded. Inequality within places is driven by the 
increasingly split structure of regional labor markets. As some workers find opportunities 
in the new economy, their earnings increase, but those who are unable to find work in 
these growing sectors are often stuck in jobs that pay less well and offer less opportunity. 
Between-place inequality is in part the result of what several scholars refer to as a 
clustering effect, which is a factor in how new economy sectors function (Nevarez, 2003, 
Moretti, 2012). Clustering is the agglomeration of workers and firms in new economy 
sectors in particular cities. Harvey (1989, 1990) sees these new patterns of clustering as 
the result of flexible accumulation, an economic pattern that results when firms re-
specialize in response to forces of globalization and increased competition. As Moretti 
(2012) explains the clustering process, “social interactions among workers tend to 
generate learning opportunities that enhance innovation and productivity. Being around 
smart people makes us smarter and more innovative” (15).This agglomeration benefits 
those who are working in these industries in these cities, but it has the effect of 
reinforcing barriers for those who work in the same sector in another city.  
Florida (2008) argues that this pattern results in “spikiness” between places as 
some places continue to grow while others are left behind. Moretti (2012) refers to this as 
the “great divergence,” in which “a handful of cities with the ‘right’ industries and a solid 
base of human capital keep attracting good employers and offering high wages, while 
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those at the other extreme, cities with the ‘wrong’ industries and a limited human capital 
base, are stuck with dead-end jobs and low average wages.” (3-4).  
This pattern of increased inequality between places which is exacerbated by 
attractive forces between those working in new economy sectors are also understood 
beyond the urban region. In in Hollowing Out the Middle, Carr and Kefalas (2009) 
examine the processes of rural brain drain through the reality of a small town in Iowa. 
Another view on this same pattern of inequality between places is what Neal (2011) calls 
the city’s position “in networks of interurban exchanges” such as air travel through local 
airports. Several distinct studies have demonstrated a positive association between travel 
through a city’s airport(s) and employment (Brueckner 1985; Irwin and Kasarda, 1991; 
Goetz, 1992; Debbage and Delk, 2001). Such studies contribute to a model of what Neal 
(2011) calls an “urban hierarchy,” or understanding U.S. cities as a set of interrelated but 
differentially advantaged places, each presenting competing for investment, traffic, and 
involvement from whatever resources might contribute to further development. 
 In this new urban economy, the opportunities offered by metropolitan regions 
continue to diverge, becoming more unequal between places. As Moretti (2012) argues, 
workers find themselves in a situation in which, “Your salary depends more on where 
you live than your resume” (88). But inequality between places is not the only way in 
which inequality is growing in the new urban economy. Inequality within places is also 
growing in the new urban economy. Massey (2007), considering a figure which 
illuminates income segregation in largest 50 metro areas of the US from 1970 to 2000, 
explains that “class segregation increased sharply between 1970 and 1990, with 
residential dissimilarity between poor and affluent households rising from .287 to .43” 
(192). 
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Florida (2002) recognized that growth of the creative class may be associated with 
growing inequality at the metropolitan level. Florida (2002) explained that while city 
growth may be driven by the creative class, this same growth necessitates an increase in 
low skill and low wage jobs to support this growing class. As he stated, “in many lower-
end service jobs … the jobs continue to be ‘de-skilled’ or ‘de-creatified’” (71). This class, 
he attests, works “low-end, typically low-wage and low-autonomy occupations, such as 
janitors and personal care attendants, in the so-called ‘service sector’ of the economy” 
(71). As a result, he argued that alongside the growing creative class is a social group he 
labels the service class. 
For the paperback edition, Florida developed an inequality index based in part on 
his creative class occupational categorization. As he explained, “The Inequality Index is 
not part of the Creativity Index, but its relation to creativity is fascinating and disturbing 
– though not, perhaps, entirely unexpected. There is a strong correlation between 
inequality and creativity: The more creative a region is, the more income inequality you 
will find there” (354). Florida’s recognition of this split between what he labels the 
creative class and the service class is a useful framework with which to perceive the 
increasingly bifurcated regional labor markets. Florida explains the process: “As the 
middle has disappeared, the job market has literally been split in two” (358). This 
mutually reinforcing relationship between the creative class and the service class is a 
major cause of increasing inequality  
In his 2012 book, Florida unpacked this relationship, devoting an entire chapter to 
the geography of inequality across US metropolitan areas and another chapter on the 
“inclining significance” of class (xix). Examining more recent data, he finds that the 
service class does continue to grow in numbers in association with the creative class (46). 
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He argues that the growth of the service class is due in large part to the growth of the 
creative economy. As he writes, “the Creative Class has increasingly outsourced 
functions that were previously provided within the family to the Service Class” (47). 
Sassen (2012) makes a similar argument, as she describes “sharp polarization in the profit 
making capabilities of different sectors of the economy” (10). This polarization, she 
concludes, is growing, and “is engendering massive distortions in the operations of 
various markets, from housing to labor” (10). So, scholars examining changes in 
metropolitan inequality from various perspectives are concluding that the overall pattern 
is increased polarization in earnings. 
To examine this increased polarization, Florida (2012) explores two measures of 
inequality. One is wage inequality based on a coefficient created by his research partner 
that compares wages between the creative class and other classes. Using this measure, he 
acknowledges that his list of the most unequal cities reads “like a who’s who of Creative 
Class centers” (359). This increase in inequality is not the result of declining earnings for 
the poorest in creative class cities, though, as he finds that those at the bottom “also do 
better” in metropolitan areas where this wage gap is largest. He acknowledges, though, 
that this is often mitigated by higher housing prices. The other measure uses a Gini 
coefficient calculated based on all of the individuals’ income within the metropolitan 
areas. He finds that these two measures reveal very different results. Smaller cities appear 
more frequently on the list of most unequal metros in total income, while the list of most 
unequal cities by Gini includes larger cities more commonly associated with extreme 
inequality (360-2). This is supported by his findings that cities with a high proportion of 
creative class members, like Boulder, CO, and Austin, TX, rank higher in inequality than 
cities commonly associated with inequality, like Washington, DC. He argues that these 
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findings support not only a reinvigorated consideration of class, but also the value of 
studying inequality at the level of the metropolitan area. While the evidence provided by 
both of these measures is compelling, the fact that both measures are developed through 
the creative class, rather than a more standard inequality measure, is problematic for 
generalizability. The dramatic variations not only in earnings inequality, but also in 
opportunity structures between metropolitan areas, and in neighborhoods within 
metropolitan areas, demands continued scrutiny. A more thorough assessment of these 
patterns of inequality, developed separately from any commitment to the creative class 
concepts is needed.  
 As we can see from these descriptions of the processes that exacerbate within-
MSA inequality, the earnings opportunities in these local labor markets are perceived as 
becoming increasingly split, , or bifurcated. The dual economy literature, which emerged 
in the 1980s, provides a useful framework for understanding an increasingly bifurcated 
labor market. Because this literature emphasizes how structures shape work opportunities 
and because its focus is on understanding how structures lead to greater inequality, this 
literature may prove useful within this study. 
The dual economy literature emerged several decades ago, just as 
deindustrialization reached its height in many cities across the U.S. As Hodson and 
Kaufman (1982) explain, by the 1970’s stratification scholars had recognized the 
“persistence of poverty and the continuation of large racial and gender inequalities” 
despite massive expansion of training and education programs across the U.S. (728). 
These programs were expected to alleviate at least some of persistent problems of 
inequality, and their failure suggested shortcomings in the academic understanding of 
stratification.  
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Frustrated and anxious to build better frameworks for understanding the U.S. 
stratification system, several scholars realized that structural characteristics may have a 
larger role in the stratification system than earlier theories recognized. This led to the 
development of dual economy approaches, beginning with O’Connor’s (1973) chapter 
“An Anatomy of American State Capitalism.” The chapter laid out a simple model of the 
U.S. economy and labor system which was the foundation for the dual economy 
approach. The model argues that the U.S. economic system may be divided into three 
groups of overlapping and interrelated, but still distinct industries – competitive, 
monopolistic, and state.  
Both Hodson (1978) and Beck, Horan, and Tolbert (1978) moved this approach 
further, while others, such as Baron and Bielby (1980, 1984), brought critiques. By the 
mid-1980’s, a thesis-antithesis-synthesis process was realized. The dual economy 
perspective was advanced, criticized, and reformed. By the end of this scholarly 
conversation, Baron and Bielby, through their 1984 piece pushed the work away from an 
arbitrary sectoral dichotomy and toward a recognition of a continuum of firm’s or 
industry’s location in the economy, which coincided with Hodson and Kaufman’s (1982) 
resource perspective.  
 While the dual economy approach has laid relatively dormant for a couple of 
decades, related arguments have emerged in urban sociology. For example, work like that 
of Morris, Bernhardt, and Handcock’s (1994), which investigates changing patterns of 
inequality in the U.S. based on data from 1967-1987 Current Population Survey data, is a 
good example. The authors find support for what they label the polarization thesis, which 
argues that the growth of service jobs raises the numbers of both high-wage and low-
wage service jobs, with declines in the middle.  
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Studying the manufacturing decline associated with globalization and 
deindustrialization, as well as the growth of the technology sector, suggests that labor 
markets are becoming more dichotomous in the work opportunities they offer. The 
relatively high-paying manufacturing jobs which supported the middle class for decades 
have all but disappeared in most regions. Meanwhile, many of the new job opportunities 
that have emerged have been low-paying, often unstable service occupations or the high-
paying, but also high-skill demand, technology jobs.  
The argument, then, is not an entirely new one, but is one that needs revisiting. 
The argument is that these national processes of deindustrialization, restructuring, and 
growth around new economy sectors actually exacerbate inequality in metropolitan 
regions. While new growth in high technology sectors is good for some workers, it is not 
good for all workers. While restructuring in a rust belt city like Pittsburgh is great for 
well-educated creative workers, it does not directly benefit those workers without the 
human capital, or the opportunity to retrain, to play a role in the new economy. In sun 
belt city’s with growth almost entirely rooted in the new economy, there is even less 
room for a strong middle (or lower-middle) class to develop because there is less 
manufacturing. Metropolitan regions, then, may be expected to develop increasingly 
bifurcated labor markets to the extent to which each has experiences this economic 
transition.  
This, then, leads us to several empirical questions which will be investigated in 
this study. The next few sections delineate several descriptive questions and hypotheses 
which will be tested in this study. Additional summary of the relevant literature is also 
provided in building towards these questions and hypotheses. 
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2.4 DESCRIPTIVE QUESTIONS 
The analyses in this study will investigate the impact of each of these three trends 
in the new urban economy. As elaborated in chapters 3 and 4, employment in high-
technology industries and creative class occupations will be used as indicators of the new 
economy. Place will be a major factor in the analysis as each of the analyses will move 
through the MSA-level, and geographic mobility will also be considered. Finally, several 
indicators of inequality will be used to explore the processes of inequality anticipated in 
this analysis. 
As we saw above, scholars of the new urban economy argue that place is an 
increasingly important determinant of earnings opportunities (Florida, 2012; Moretti, 
2012). The scholarship delineated in here encourages many questions about the landscape 
of earnings and inequality across the new urban economy. While each metropolitan area 
has been uniquely influenced by some combination of these forces, it is important to 
understand the geography of earnings opportunities across the US. In Chapter 4, I will 
answer the following descriptive questions: 
 To what extent do earnings vary across MSA’s? 
 To what extent do other characteristics including geographic mobility of the labor 
force and educational attainment of labor force vary across MSA’s? 
 To what extent do indicators of the new economy vary across MSA’s? 
 To what extent does earnings inequality vary across MSA’s? 
 What important changes may be observed among these characteristics between 
1990 and 2000? 
 
2.5 MSA-LEVEL HYPOTHESES 
Having addressed these descriptive questions, the study will then examine how 
MSA-level characteristics are associated with each other. In chapter 5 I will test for 
associations between MSA-level characteristics using a correlation analysis. These tests 
will be based on the hypotheses elaborated below. 
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 While scholars of the new urban economy generally agree about human capital 
driving economic growth, there is some debate about the association between rates of 
employment in new economy sectors and inequality within MSA’s. Florida (2012) has 
argued for more than a decade that the creative class members are drivers of the modern 
urban economy. In more recent writings, Florida has acknowledged what he sees as an 
interdependent relationship between the creative class and the service class, explaining 
that “There is a strong correlation between inequality and creativity: The more creative a 
region is, the more income inequality you will find there” (2012; 354). In Florida’s model 
of the new urban economy, creative class workers are dependent on the low-cost services 
provided by service class workers, and this interdependence results in increased 
inequality where the creative class is increasing.  
Moretti (2012) has a contrasting perspective. His model of the new urban 
economy emphasizes inequality between MSA’s. He contends that a person’s salary 
depends more on the city in which they live than their resume (2012:88). Moretti comes 
to this conclusion by arguing “Attracting a scientists or a software engineer to a city 
triggers a multiplier effect, increasing employment and salaries for those who provide 
local services” (2012:12-13). This two-fold ripple effect that increases both the number 
of other jobs and the level of income earned in those jobs means that growth in new 
economy sectors should not increase within-MSA inequality, but decrease it.  
These two views leave us with diametrically opposed perspectives. Using 
Florida’s model, growth in new economy sectors in any MSA should be associated with 
increased within-MSA inequality. Using Moretti’s model, growth in new economy 
sectors should increase all workers earnings, suppressing any increased inequality caused 
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by inflation of earnings at the highest income levels. Each of these will be systematically 
tested in the ensuing analysis. 
The first set of hypotheses examines associations between MSA-level 
characteristics and MSA-level median earnings. Education is broadly understood to be 
associated with higher earnings, but the first hypothesis tests this association at the MSA-
level. The second hypothesis tests the argument from the new urban economy literature 
that earnings will be associated with the proportion of individuals employed in new 
economy sectors. The third hypothesis tests the impact of individual geographic mobility, 
which would be related to the clustering effects expected in the new economy literature, 
on MSA-level earnings. As the proportion of workers who have been geographically 
mobile increases in an MSA, median earnings are also expected to increase. 
 Hypothesis 1A: The proportion of workers in MSA’s with a college degree or 
higher will be positively related to MSA-level median earnings.  
 Hypothesis 1B: The proportion of workers in MSA’s employed in new economy 
sectors will be positively related to MSA-level median earnings. 
 Hypothesis 1C: The proportion of geographically mobile workers in MSA’s will 
be positively related to MSA-level median earnings. 
 
The next set of hypotheses examines associations between indicators of the new 
economy and indicators of inequality at the MSA-level. In Chapter 3 the indicators of the 
new economy used in this study are elaborated. They include educational attainment in 
the workforce, as well as employment in high-technology industries, employment in the 
creative class (and also the super creative core). The three indicators of inequality at the 
MSA-level used here are the Gini index, the 90:20 earnings ratio, and the employed low 
earner rate in each MSA. The low earner rate is the proportion of individuals in the 
sample in each MSA that whose earnings were at or below the poverty level. All 
individuals in the sample are employed, so this is an employed low earner rate.  
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Hypothesis 2A states the expectation of an association between the proportion of 
individuals with a college degree or more in an MSA and the three indicators of 
inequality. Hypothesis 2B examines associations between indicators of new economy 
employment and the indicators of inequality. This hypothesis is particularly interesting 
because it is here that the disagreement between Moretti (2012) and Florida (2012) about 
the impact of new economy workers on regional inequality will be tested. In Moretti’s 
view, the multiplier effect means that additional innovative jobs are associated with both 
more jobs, and higher pay for all jobs in that metropolitan region. Florida’s argument 
disagrees, as he acknowledges an association between the creative class jobs and 
inequality based on the creative class’s dependence on often low-paying service class 
jobs. So, when asking if the rising tide of new economy jobs lifts all boats at the MSA-
level, the results of the tests of hypothesis 2B will answer that question. To round out 
these tests of associations with inequality, hypothesis 2C tests whether the proportion of 
geographically mobile workers in an MSA is associated with inequality. 
 Hypothesis 2A: The proportion of workers in MSA’s with a college degree or 
higher will be positively related to MSA-level indicators of inequality.  
 Hypothesis 2B: The proportion of workers in MSA’s employed in new economy 
sectors will be positively related to MSA-level indicators of inequality. 
 Hypothesis 2C: The proportion of geographically mobile workers in will be 
positively related to MSA-level indicators of inequality. 
 
Many scholars of the new urban economy suggest that the impact of new 
economy workers on their urban region has increased over time. For example, Florida 
argues that the creative class is the “economic driver” of this new economy (2002). 
Moretti contends that the agglomeration of innovative workers is reshaping the 
geography of the US. From these arguments, we can anticipate that whatever the 
associations are between the new economy jobs and both earnings and indicators of 
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inequality, those associations must be growing stronger over time. Hypothesis 3 
examines this argument. 
 Hypothesis 3: The relationships tested in hypotheses 1A through 2C will be 
stronger in 2000 than in 1990. 
 
If the impact of new economy employment is growing over time, then we can also 
anticipate that positive change in proportions of employment in these sectors within a 
particular MSA should also be associated with both higher earnings in that MSA and 
higher indicators of inequality in that MSA. Hypotheses 4A and 4B examine this 
argument. 
 Hypothesis 4A: The change in the MSA-level proportion of workers employed in 
new economy sectors will be positively related to MSA-level median earnings. 
 Hypothesis 4B: The change in the MSA-level proportion of workers employed in 
new economy sectors employment will be positively related to MSA-level 
indicators of inequality. 
 
2.6 MULTI-LEVEL HYPOTHESES 
While the above hypotheses flow relatively directly from the model of the new 
urban economy described throughout the literature, expectations for what this uneven 
geography of opportunity means for individual opportunities and earnings require a little 
more development. Because consensus holds that the attainment of higher degrees is 
positively associated with higher earnings, most research examining individual-level 
factors which are associated with earnings focus on other individual-level variables, 
particularly race and gender (Tomaskovic-Devey, Thomas, and Johnson 2005; Huffman 
and Cohen, 2004; Cotter et al, 1997). While such factors have been examined thoroughly, 
the variation of the impact of educational attainment across labor markets anticipates 
more exploration. Meanwhile, scholars of urban life, economics, and stratification have 
become increasingly interested in place as a factor in occupational outcomes such as 
earnings (Nevarez, 2003; Florida, 2002, 2008, 2012; and Moretti, 2012). Therefore, an 
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important next step in the research agenda is to bring labor market level factors into 
models of earnings, while also modeling how the labor market level factors effects the 
individual level.  
Several theoretical arguments inform expectations about how and why the 
relationship between educational attainment and earnings may vary across MSA’s. 
Queuing theory (Kornrich, 2009) and other related statements suggest that the value of a 
higher degree will decrease as the local labor market becomes flooded with higher 
degrees. Briefly, the queuing theory argument is that laws of supply and demand will 
have an impact on the value of higher degrees in  labor market.Meanwhile, arguments 
about the nature of the new economy and the demands of the creative class suggest that 
areas concentrated with a high proportion of workers employed in the new economy 
(high-technology industries or creative class occupations) will see higher demand and 
therefore higher rewards for higher degrees (Nevarez, 2003; Florida, 2012).  
Specifically, this study examines if the relationship between an individuals’ 
education, and their employment in either high-technology industries, or creative class 
occupations, and their earnings varies across labor markets. For this study, the labor 
market is conceptualized as the MSA, as done by Cotter, et al (1997) and Hoffman and 
Cohen (2004). At the individual level, this study will investigate the impact of 
characteristics such as educational attainment, employment in high-technology industries 
or creative class occupations, as well as demographic factors such as age, race, marriage 
and having children. Meanwhile, this study will also investigate the impact of MSA-level 
characteristics such as rates of college education in the MSA, percent of residents 
employed in high-technology industries and creative class occupations, and levels of 
inequality. The focus of the hypotheses delineated below is to investigate the relationship 
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between an individual’s educational attainment and their earnings, asking whether and 
why it varies significantly across MSA’s.  
The impact of labor market effects on earnings has been considered in several 
relevant studies. For instance, Hanson and Pratt (1992) investigate the ways in which 
unique local characteristics of labor markets shape interactions between employees and 
employers. Whether qualitative or quantitative in nature, many of these studies are 
limited by their case study focus, as they examine only one or a small number of labor 
markets at a time (Leete and Bania, 1999). Some movement has been made toward 
involving labor markets as a simultaneous, additional level of analysis, such as Williams 
(2002) work which develops a hierarchical model to examine how young women’s 
choices in the labor market are shaped by their labor market. More recent studies have 
demonstrated the value of investigating earnings through a multi-level model, particularly 
Cotter et. al’s (1997) work examining gender differences in earnings in Metropolitan 
Statistical Areas (MSA’s)and Huffman and Cohen’s (2004) work examining racial wage 
inequality with individual’s nested within jobs within Metropolitan Statistical Areas. 
 Drawing from these and works elaborated below, this study will advance two 
major arguments in describing how MSA-level factors impact individual earnings. The 
first argument that this examination anticipates is that as a labor market experiences 
increased rates of higher education among its workers, a queuing effect develops that 
reduces the (still quite positive) impact of individual education attainment on earnings. 
Queuing theory argues that individual skill levels, or educational attainment, relative to 
that of the rest of their labor market, are of primary importance in determining 
employment, and therefore earnings outcomes. Queuing theory is related to work on 
skills and spatial mismatch. Kasarda’s (1989) work is among the first and best statements 
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of the skills and spatial mismatch perspectives. Handel’s (2003) work is a recent example 
of the skills mismatch perspective. He argues that the work-related skills of the labor 
force do not match the skill requirements of available jobs (and that this explains growing 
wage inequality in the United States) (135). Considering whether the skills mismatch 
derives from lagging educational attainment or increasing skill demands, Handel argues 
that more research is needed, stating, “There is little information on whether job demands 
are actually exceeding workers’ capacities” (135).  
Stoll, Holzer, and Ihlandfeldt’s (2000) work is a prime example of the spatial 
mismatch perspective. The authors compared the spatial distribution of new jobs and 
people across sub-metropolitan areas in four major US cities. Their results demonstrated 
significant spatial mismatch (207). More recently, research has combined these two 
perspectives. For example, Stoll (2005) examines “geographical skills mismatch” in Los 
Angeles and Atlanta, finding that both are factors in unemployment (695). Houston 
(2005) also worked to reconcile the skills mismatch and spatial mismatch perspectives. 
His work concludes that skills and spatial mismatches reinforce each other and that the 
concept of employability may improve understanding of how job searchers and 
employers make decisions in situations of skills and/or spatial mismatch (221). 
Boylan’s (1993) early work on queues demonstrated that the number of diplomas 
do have an effect on the value of a diploma in a labor market (206). Kornrich’s (2009) 
work is at the forefront of bringing queuing theory into urban research as he brought 
spatial mismatch theory into a framework built on queuing theory (1). He explains that 
queuing theory, “suggests that the ordering and composition of labor and job queues 
determine the matches between workers and jobs” (2). He argues that the “characteristics 
of labor and job queues significantly influence the extent of black-white inequality” (1). 
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If queues have such an impact on black-white inequality, a natural next question is to 
what extent queues may impact disparities between those with higher degrees and those 
without, i.e. does the value of a higher degree vary based on the queue, or local labor 
market, within which it is located?  From this perspective, the value of a higher degree 
may be anticipated to decrease as the proportion of higher degrees (or the length of the 
queue) grows.  
This queuing effect is not the expectation of all scholars. Moretti (2012), for 
instance, argues that in the new urban economy, a rising tide lifts all boats. As he 
explains: 
“A worker’s education has an effect not just on his own salary, but on the 
entire community around him. The presence of many college-educated 
residents changes the local economy in profound ways, affecting both the 
kinds of jobs available and the productivity of every worker who lives 
there, including the less skilled. This results in high wages not just for 
skilled workers, but for most workers.” (5). 
As we will see, a worker’s education does also boost the local economy around him. New 
economy jobs are attracted to places where locals have a high level of human capital. At 
the same time, though, we will see how competition for work in new economy jobs 
among those with a higher degree can reduce earnings through the queuing effect, 
contradicting Moretti’s (2012) expectation. 
While a queuing effect is expected to reduce the value of an individual’s higher 
education, a clustering effect caused by growth in high-technology industries and creative 
class jobs in a worker’s MSA is expected to boost the value of an individual’s education. 
Scholars of the new urban economy widely agree that local growth in the economic 
sectors of the new economy (taken here as jobs in high-technology industries or jobs in 
creative class occupations) is propelled by a clustering effect where individuals working 
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in these sectors benefit from social connections and information sharing as the proportion 
of workers in in these sectors in their local labor markets increase (Nevarez, 2003; 
Florida, 2012, Moretti; 2012). According to Nevarez (2003), the new economy in US 
labor markets is different from that of the traditional with one example being that 
technology companies are clustering in urban areas based on their dependence on elite, 
talented workers. As he notes, firms in growing sectors of the new economy develop 
around a “flexible district” where firms come together around specific business projects 
(47). Furthermore, Nevarez recognizes that firms within these industries will often locate 
near each other, which results in specialization of urban areas. This argument suggests, 
then, that higher degrees demonstrating higher skills are more valuable in labor markets 
where such clustering has occurred. 
But not all scholars agree on how the new economy impacts all workers in local 
labor markets. Richard Florida’s creative class perspective argues in support of the 
expectation for clustering of highly-skilled workers, explaining that the world is 
becoming “spiky.” This “spiky-“-ness leads to increased inequality both between and 
within metropolitan regions. As he (2008) states, “today’s global economy is powered by 
a surprisingly small number of places. What’s more, the tallest spikes—the cities and 
regions that drive the world economy—are growing ever higher” (19). In contrast, 
Moretti (2012) contends that clustering of workers in new economy jobs increases social 
interaction and information sharing, which leads to increased innovation. This payoff 
from clustering results in what he refers to as a multiplier effect. As Moretti explains, 
“Indeed, the key lesson of the multiplier effect is that the economy is a tightly 
interconnected system, and what is good for one group typically tends to be good for 
another. This is a case where the rising tide does lift all boast – at least those boats that 
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are in the same city” (2012: 63). From this perspective, then, the value of a higher degree 
may be anticipated to increase when it is situated in labor markets where clustering has 
occurred. Such clustering could be demonstrated by higher proportions of high-skilled 
workers in the labor market. 
While these theoretical arguments are heavily debated, little has been done 
systematically explore their claims. In chapter 6 I will test several hypotheses at each of 
the levels of investigation may be extracted. These are delineated below. First, at the 
individual-level, I hypotheses that: 
 Hypothesis 5A: Individual earnings will vary across MSA’s in a statistically 
significant way. 
 Hypothesis 5B: Holding a college degree or more will be associated with 
increased individual earnings. 
 Hypothesis 5C: Being employed in a high-technology industry will be associated 
with increased individual earnings. 
 Hypothesis 5D: Being employed in creative class occupations will be associated 
with increased individual earnings. 
 
I also hypothesize that characteristics of a worker’s MSA will have an impact on their 
earnings: 
 
 Hypothesis 6A: An increase in the percentage of workers with a college degree in 
a worker’s MSA will be associated with an increase in their individual earnings. 
 Hypothesis 6B: An increase in the percentage of workers employed in high-
technology industries will be associated with an increase in their individual 
earnings. 
 Hypothesis 6C: An increase in the percentage of workers employed in creative 
class occupations in a worker’s MSA will be associated with an increase in their 
individual earnings. 
 
Finally, I am interested in how cross-level interactions between these factors impact a 
worker’s earnings opportunities: 
 Hypothesis 7A: The proportion of workers with a college degree in a worker’s 
MSA will reduce the positive relationship between individual educational 
attainment and earnings. 
 40 
 Hypothesis 7B: The proportion of workers employed in high-technology 
industries in a worker’s MSA will reduce the positive relationship between 
individual educational attainment and earnings. 
 Hypothesis 7C: The proportion of workers employed in creative class occupations 
in a worker’s MSA will reduce the positive relationship between individual 
educational attainment and earnings. 
 Hypothesis 8A: The proportion of workers with a college degree in a worker’s 
MSA will reduce the strength of the relationship between being employed in a 
high-technology industry and earnings. 
 Hypothesis 8B: The proportion of workers employed in high-technology 
industries in a worker’s MSA will increase the relationship between being 
employed in a high-technology industry and earnings. 
 Hypothesis 8C: The proportion of workers employed in creative class occupations 
in a worker’s MSA will increase the relationship between being employed in 
high-technology industries and earnings. 
 Hypothesis 9A: The proportion of workers with a college degree in a worker’s 
MSA will reduce the positive relationship between an individual being employed 
in a creative class occupation and earnings. 
 Hypothesis 9B: The proportion of workers employed in high-technology 
industries in a worker’s MSA will reduce the positive relationship between an 
individual being employed in a creative class occupation and earnings. 
 Hypothesis 9C: The proportion of workers employed in creative class occupations 
in a worker’s MSA will reduce the positive relationship between an individual 
being employed in a creative class occupation and earnings. 
 
This study is something of a foundational exercise, and as such it works to answer 
some of the most obvious questions. Many relevant and interesting questions will remain 
unanswered here, though. For example, while gender and race will be used as control 
variables in the statistical models below, the role of these characteristics in cross-level 
interactions are not investigated in depth in this study. Also, this study is explicitly 
interested in employed workers in MSA’s, and as a result, does not consider those who 
are working outside of metropolitan statistical areas or in the informal economy.  
Answering the descriptive questions and testing these hypotheses will provide a 
substantial test of the new urban economy model of modern economic growth elaborated 
here. The results will provide a cleared sense of the uneven geography of opportunities 
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for workers. They will also illuminate the role of MSA-level characteristics in shaping a 
worker’s opportunities.   
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CHAPTER 3 
DATA AND METHODS 
This chapter will delineate the data and methods used in this study. This study 
involved the gathering of two very large data sets and a series of complex statistical 
analyses. Each of these will be described in detail below. 
3.1 DATA 
The analyses in this study use two data sets. Each data set is compiled from the 
5% samples of the U.S. Census, one from 1990 and the other from 2000. These were 
acquired through the Integratged Public Use Microdata Series: Version 5.0 (IPUMS). At 
the time each data set was gathered, both were nationally representative, 1-in-20 random 
samples of the U.S. population. 
3.2 SAMPLE 
The sample includes individuals living in US MSA’s within the 48 continental 
states, who are of prime age (25-59 years old), employed in the labor market and earning 
income from wages or salary, but not working in military occupations or industries.  
In with a similar interest in “prime age” workers, he practice of imposing an age 
restriction on a sample is common. Cohn and Fossett (1995) restrict their data set to 
individuals 25-59 years old. Cohen (2001) restricts his data set to ages 25-54, a range he 
describes as “prime age” (152), and Sanders (2011) uses ages 25-59 as prime age. For 
this study, I also define prime age as 25-59, only including individuals within this age 
range in the sample. 
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The MSA is the geographic identifier in this study, and each individual is nested 
within one MSA. The MSA variable reports the MSA of residence for each respondent. 
The U.S. Census Bureau defines the concept of a metropolitan area as “a large population 
nucleus, together with adjacent communities having a high degree of social and economic 
integration with that core.” In 1990 and 2000 Census definitions of metropolitan areas 
included three types – MSA’s, as well as PMSA’s (primary metropolitan statistical 
areas), and CMSA’s (consolidated metropolitan statistical areas) (Census 2002). This 
data set actually includes a combination of MSA’s and PMSA’s, but excludes CMSA’s. 
This means, for example that the Baltimore, MD PMSA and the Washington, DC PMSA 
are each in the data set as separate MSA’s, but the combined CMSA of Washington-
Baltimore is excluded. 
The MSA is appropriate for use in this study because I am interested in how 
characteristics of labor markets of the wider areas surrounding cities influence inequality 
and individual decisions for geographic and occupational mobility. The MSA has a long 
history of use in academic studies in urban sociology and studies on labor markets, 
stratification, and inequality (Lorence, 1991; Cohn and Fossett, 1995; and Cohen, 2001). 
The MSA also takes into account the “deconcentrated” nature of many urban modern 
urban regions, as described by Gottdiener (1997: 9). A variable which reports the MSA of 
the respondent’s place of work rather than residence was available, but this variable is 
difficult to use, because, as IPUMS reports, for this variable “many metropolitan areas 
are only partially identified, and a substantial share of individuals who worked in these 
metropolitan areas are not reported as part of the workforce” (IPUMS).  
Because this study is interested in how individuals are able to leverage their 
human capital in the labor market and because individuals who are self-employed operate 
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under a different set of circumstances than  individuals searching for work in the labor 
market, self-employed  individuals and those who are not working for wages or salaries 
are excluded from all data sets. While many self-employed workers may be doing 
creative or high-technology work, this study is interested in how regional labor markets 
are structured by the new economy, and is therefore focused on individuals that have 
found their jobs through the labor market. As is the custom in similar studies, individuals 
working for the military are removed from the samples because they are not competing 
for work under the same labor market pressures. Because the research questions focus on 
earnings, individuals who are unemployed, but searching for work in the labor market 
were removed from the sample. For similar reasons, self-employed individuals also are 
not included in the sample. At the individual level the sample represents a target 
population of employed adults working in MSA’s. 
3.3 INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL VARIABLES 
A variety of individual-level variables are used throughout this study. The 
earnings variable is particularly important because it is used as the outcome variable in 
the multi-level analysis in Chapter 5, and it is also used to calculate several MSA-level 
variables. Individual earnings are defined using the Census definition of wage and salary 
which “includes total money earnings received for work performed as an employee 
during the calendar year preceding each survey.” (US Census Bureau 2008). This 
variable is used because it measures individual income from the primary sources from 
which individual income may be earned in their labor market, and opportunities for this 
kind of income are impacted by labor market competition and geographic space. Other 
forms of income, investment dividends for example, may occur outside of where the 
individual actually lives or works. The variable, then, was chosen because it is subject to 
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labor market effects. This variable is top-coded to protect the identity of the less common 
high earners (Census, 2008, p. 7-75).  
The next important individual-level variable is educational attainment. In the 
original survey, educational attainment indicates the highest year of school or degree 
completed. When compiling this data set for this study, the detailed version of this 
variable, which includes all information available in each year, was used. This variable 
was then recoded into two dichotomous variables. The first of these is “Bachelor’s 
Degree or More” with the comparison group being all individuals with less than a 
Bachelor’s Degree. The second is “More than Bachelor’s Degree,” with the reference 
group being all individuals with a Bachelor’s degree or less. Both are used for the 
analysis in Chapter 5, but only the first is used in Chapter 6. 
Another important individual-level variable is geographic mobility. The 
geographic mobility variable is calculated by comparing the reported metropolitan area 
the respondent lived in five years prior to the survey their current MSA of residence. 
Each case where these variables do not match is considered geographically mobile. A 
small number of MSA’s were excluded from the data set because they were not 
comparable between 1990 and 2000 on this variable, or because of problems some 
missing data on this variable within those MSA’s. 
Several indicators of the new economy are used in this analysis, and these are 
based on categories of employment at the individual level. The first is a dichotomous 
variable representing employment in high-technology industries. When aggregated at the 
MSA level, this variable represents the proportion of high-technology industries in each 
MSA. Hackler (2003) studies location of high-tech manufacturing firms, defining high-
technology manufacturers as those employing at least a minimum proportion of workers 
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in certain occupations. Hecker’s (2005) article from the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
defines high-technology industries based on a minimum threshold for the proportion of 
the industry’s total employment in technology-oriented occupations. In this study, 
Hecker’s (2005) definitions for high-technology industries were used, with those 
industries which were high-technology being aggregated by their North American 
Industry Classification System (NAICS) code. Some examples of jobs in these industries 
include computer and mathematical sciences, engineers, manufacturing in aerospace and 
medicine, and even wholesalers of high-technology goods like computers.  NAICS codes 
were not available for the 1990 data set, however. To have the ability to compare the 
proportion of workers employed in high-technology industries in both 1990 and 2000, I 
created a new high-technology industry aggregation based on the 1990 Census Bureau 
industrial classification scheme, the variables for which were available in both data sets. 
Comparisons between the NAICS and the Census classification aggregations in the 2000 
data revealed a high degree of similarity. 
The second indicator of employment in the new economy is a dichotomous 
variable for employment in a creative class occupation, and also a dichotomous variable 
indicating employment in the smaller category of the super-creative core of the creative 
class. Both are aggregations of occupational codes from the Standard Occupation 
Classificaton System (OCCSOC) following the aggregation outlined by Florida (2002). 
The occupations aggregated in thesuper creative core are: computer and mathematical, 
architecture and engineering, life, physical, and social science, education, training, and 
library, arts, design, entertainment, sports, and media occupations. In addition to the 
super creative core, the broader creative class category also includes management, 
businesss and financial operations, legal, healthcare practitioners and technical, high-end 
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sales and sales management occupations. When aggregated at the MSA level, these each 
represent the proportion of employed workers employed in those occupational categories 
in each MSA. Florida (2002: 328-9, 2012: 401-2) and his colleagues Stolarick and 
Mellander define the creative class based on aggregations of the Standard Occupational 
Classification (SOC) system. Markusen, et al (2008) explores a variety of industry and 
occupational approaches to defining the creative class. As Reese, Faist, and Sands (2010) 
recognize, a variety of operationalizations of the creative class have proliferated in the 
literature. Some of these focus on the expected characteristics of creative workers, such 
as tolerance and diversity, while others, like Florida’s are based simply on the worker’s 
occupational category. For this analysis, I re-created Florida’s occupational aggregations 
for the creative class and the super creative core. The super creative core is a direct 
recoding of four of the major SOC groups. Creating the aggregation for the more 
inclusive creative class aggregation was a bit more complicated because one group 
defined by Florida (high-end sales and sales management) takes only a few of the 
categories in sales, placing others sales categories in his service class group. I made my 
best informed guesses at recreating this group. Again, like the NAICS codes, the SOC 
system codes were not available in the 1990 data set, and so I created variables similar to 
them, based on the 1990 Census Bureau occupational classification scheme, which are 
comparable across decades. 
Several other individual-level variables are used in this study, primarily as control 
variables in the analysis presented in Chapter 6. These include race, as well as some work 
and family variables. Race is divided into four categories – white, black, Hispanic, and 
other race. To create these dichotomous race variables, first, the detailed Hispanic 
variable was recoded into a dummy variable of Hispanic or non-Hispanic. Then, all non-
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Hispanic cases were recoded into three dummy variables for race – non-Hispanic white 
(or not), non-Hispanic black (or not) and non-Hispanic other. Additional work variables 
include dichotomous variables for employment by the government, or in a non-profit 
organization (contrasted with employment in the private sector). They also include a 
dichotomous variable for working at least 40 hours per week, and working at least 
twenty-six weeks. Family variables include a dichotomous variable for being married and 
another for having children. An individual-level variable is also included for gender. 
3.4 MSA-LEVEL VARIABLES 
 For each year (1990 and 2000) there are separate data sets for each level of 
analysis. Because the sample only had data for the individual-level, all variables at the 
MSA-level were calculated based on aggregations of all individuals within the final 
individual-level sample within each MSA. So, the MSA-level characteristics variables 
each represent the aggregation of all individuals in this sample within each MSA, not the 
overall population of the MSA. 
The first MSA-level variable of interest is median earnings. A median earnings 
value is calculated for each MSA based  on the earnings of individual in the sample in 
that MSA. After this, three indicators of MSA-level inequality were calculated. Like 
median earnings, the first two of these measures are based on wage and salary earnings of 
all cases within each MSA. The first inequality indicator is a 90 to 20 earnings ratio, 
comparable to the one used by Smeeding (2005) and Massey (2007). Massey (2007) 
adopted a 90 to 20 earnings ratio as a primary measure of inequality. This ratio measures 
the earnings distribution in each MSA by comparing the earnings at two different points 
in the distribution. For the 90/20 ratio, the ratio compares the 90
th
 percentile and 20
th
 




percentile as a reference point, this measure of inequality is particularly sensitive to 
inequality caused by “stretching” of the earnings distribution by high-income earners. 
The second indicator of inequality is the Gini coefficient. This was also calculated 
based on the earnings reported for each individual in the sample within each MSA. The 
Gini coefficient is commonly used to measure inequalities, from income inequality to 
inequality in university rankings (Shorrock, 1978; Halffman & Leydesdorf, 2010). This 
index compares earnings across the distribution of earnings in the sample. The index may 
range from 0 to 1, though the extremes are rarely reached. For this indicator, a 0 means 
complete equality and a 1 means perfect inequality; the lower the value, the more equal 
the distribution. In this study, the Gini index values were calculated in the statistical 
program R, using the computational package based on the work of Handcock and Morris 
(1999). While the 90 to 20 earnings ratio is particularly sensitive to high-income earners, 
the Gini coefficient is more sensitive to fluctuations in the proportion of middle-range 
income earners. 
The third indicator of inequality used here is the low earner rate in each MSA. 
This measure is based on a variable in the survey which compared each individual’s 
overall earnings to their local poverty level of income. The measure used here reports all 
individuals in the sample whose overall earnings were at or below 100% of their local 
poverty rate. Aggregated to the MSA-level, this indicator represents the proportion of 
workers in the sample earning at or below poverty-level income. This is not actually a 
measure of inequality because if 100% of the sample in an MSA had earnings at exactly 
the poverty rate, there would be a very high poverty rate, but no inequality in that MSA. 
Also, MSA-level values for the poverty rate in this study does not accurately represent 
the actual poverty rate for the entire population of an MSA, but rather the rate of low 
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earning employed individuals in this sample. The measure is a useful indicator here 
because it is sensitive to lower income levels, as it represents what percentages of 
workers are earning below a standard measure of low income. 
After the variables described above, several MSA-level variables were calculated 
based on aggregations of the dichotomous individual level variables. MSA-level 
variables were calculated which report the percentage of workers in each MSA that work 
in high-technology industries or creative class occupations. MSA-level variables also 
report the percentage of individuals that are male, married, have children, worked at least 
40 hours per week, worked at least 26 weeks the previous year, identify as each of the 
four race categories, and were geographically mobile. Average age was calculated for 
each MSA as well. 
3.5 CORRELATION ANALYSIS METHODS 
 I used a variety of statistical methods in this analysis. Descriptive questions were 
answered using basic statistical techniques, including calculating median earnings for 
MSA’s and the proportions of workers employed in new economy sectors in each MSA. 
But testing the hypotheses as is done in chapters 4 and 5 required several statistical 
techniques. 
In Chapter 5, a correlation analysis is conducted examining associations between 
MSA-level characteristics in an effort that tests the MSA-level hypotheses in this study. 
Each of the MSA-Level hypotheses was tested using the MSA-level data from both the 
2000 and 1990 data sets. A series of two-tailed Pearson correlation tests were conducted. 
Each tested for linear associations between the relevant MSA-level characteristics, and 
tests were run for both 2000 and 1990 data. The variables used in these tests are defined 
in detail in Chapter 3. Results of these correlation tests are reported in Tables 5.1 and 5.2. 
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 Some of the hypotheses tested in chapter 5 examine whether the strength of the 
correlation between two MSA-level variables is stronger in 2000 than in 1990. A Fisher 
Z transformation test was conducted to test these hypotheses. The Fisher Z 
transformation test makes it possible to determine if the difference in strength between 
two different correlation results from two independent samples is statistically significant 
(Fisher 1915; Howell, 2004 cited in Pickering, 2004). The Fisher Z transformation test 
was conducted using two online calculators, with the same results emerging from both 
tests (Lowry 2013, Boersma 2013). 
3.6 CROSS-LEVEL ANALYSIS METHODS AND VARIABLES 
The analysis in chapter 6 relied on a multi-level analysis using hierarchical linear 
modeling. This part of the analysis focuses on examining how the relationship between 
individual characteristics, such as geographic mobility or educational attainment and 
earnings varies across MSA’s. This portion of the study deals with nested data, 
individual’s nested within MSA’s, and therefore a multi-level modeling technique is 
appropriate for use in this analysis. Multi-level modeling techniques allow the researcher 
to avoid correlated error problems, associated with nested data, such as effects of local 
labor markets while also making it possible to test for statistical significance of factors at 
the appropriate level (and sample size) (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002). When testing for 
correlation with earnings all predictor variables were centered on their group-mean, thus 
normalizing for the clustering of cases that are expected to have a greater than chance 
similarity by their spatial proximity (e.g. individuals working in the same MSA). This 
process allows the researcher to rigorously control for population differences in each 
aggregate, preventing the discovery of effects which are purely compositional. 
Furthermore, by multi-level modeling, this study removes variation attributed to 
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individual level effects that might also be due to compositional differences across 
MSA’s. 
 The dependent variable examined in the models in Chapter 6 is individual 
earnings. In the models, the natural log of earnings is used to adjust for the distribution of 
earnings. The earnings variable is measured through wage and salary income. Wage and 
salary income is defined by the Census as income that “includes total money earnings 
received for work performed as an employee during the calendar year 1999. It includes 
wages, salary, armed forces pay, commissions, tips, piece-rate payments, and cash 
bonuses earned before deductions were made for taxes, bonds, pensions, union dues, etc.” 
(US Census Bureau 2008). This variable is used because it measures individual income 
from the primary sources from which individual income may be earned in their labor 
market, and opportunities for this kind of income are shaped by labor market competition 
and geographic space. Other forms of income, investment dividends for example, may 
occur outside of where the individual actually lives or works. The variable, then, was 
chosen because it is subject to labor market effects. This variable is top-coded to protect 
the identity of the less common high earners (Census, 2008, p. 7-75). The additional 





LANDSCAPE OF INEQUALITY: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
This chapter will work to answer the descriptive questions that emerged in 
Chapter 2. While doing so, the chapter will explore the landscape of earnings inequality 
among employed wage earners across US metropolitan statistical areas (MSA’s) in 2000 
and 1990. This landscape, or uneven geography of earnings opportunities, will be 
surveyed using the data sets constructed for this study. Descriptive statistics for the both 
individual and MSA-level data sets will be reported, along with some views on the 
variation in MSA-level characteristics, particularly earnings, inequality, and rates of 
employment in high-technology industries and creative class occupations. 
Descriptive statistics for both individual-level and MSA-level variables in both 
the 1990 and 2000 data set are reported in this Chapter. Tables 4.1 and 4.2 report MSA-
Level descriptive statistics for the year 2000 and the year 1990, respectively. Table 4.3 
reports descriptive statistic for the individual-level data set for the year 2000. Tables and 
figures are placed at the end of the chapter.  
The first descriptive question asks to what extent earnings vary across MSA’s. In 
2000, median earnings across MSAs ranged from $17,000 to $46,700 with a mean of 
$28,964. The range had increased from 1990, when it ranged from $12,000 to $30,000, 
with a mean of $20,613. Stamford, CT ranked as the MSA with the highest median 
earnings in both decades (it was tied with two others in 1990), while the McAllen-
Edinburgh-Pharr-Mission MSA, an MSA in Texas near the Mexico border, ranked at the 
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bottom in both decades. Tables 4.4 and 4.5 present data from 2000 for each MSA in this 
study, including new economy and inequality indicators.  
Several figures map particular variables of interest in the study across US MSA’s. 
Figure 4.1 shows median earnings across MSA’s, and Figure 4.2 shows the same 
variable, but classifies MSA’s by their standard deviation from the mean of median 
earnings ($28,964). Figure 4.3 relates the percentage of workers employed in the creative 
class in each MSA, and Figure 4.4 does the same for percentage employed in high-
technology industries. Figure 4.5 shows the Gini coefficient by MSA, classified into 5 
groups. 
The next descriptive question asks to what extent do other characteristics such as 
geographic mobility of the labor force and educational attainment of labor force vary 
across MSA’s? Considering these in reverse order, in 2000 on average 28.46% of this 
population in each MSA had a bachelor’s degree or more. This characteristic varied 
widely across MSA’s however, with some MSA’s having nearly 60% of their wage 
earners holding a college degree or higher, while other MSA’s had percentages in the low 
teens. This represented an increase in the percentage of the population with a college 
degree or more from 1990, when this characteristic ranged from 12% to 47% across the 
same MSA’s, with an average of  25.05%. As for geographic mobility, in 2000 on 
average 30.34% of each MSA’s population had been geographically mobile in the 
previous five years, and this is actually a small decrease from the 31.27% average in 
1990. When counting only those individuals who have earned a higher degree beyond the 
Bachelor’s, in 2000 the average percent of people in the workforce across MSA’s with a 
higher degree was 9.86%. This represents slightly more than a 1% increase from the 1990 
average. What may be of most interest here is the large range in educational attainment 
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across MSA’s. By 2000, some MSA’s had a workforce in which only 4% had earned a 
degree beyond the bachelors, while only 14% of the workforce had at least a bachelor’s. 
Meanwhile, other MSA’s had a workforce with nearly 60% holding at least a college 
degree and more than a quarter holding a degree beyond the bachelor’s. 
How indicators of the new economy vary across MSA’s is the next question of 
interest. Using the BLS definition, employment in high-technology industries ranged 
from 5 to 40% across MSA’s in 2000, with an average of 12.60 percent. These numbers 
are very similar in 2000 which using aggregation for high-technology industries which is 
comparable between 1990 and 2000, with a range of 5 to 42% and a slightly higher 
average of 12.87%. Looking back, this average is actually dropped from 13.32% in 1990. 
While the average dropped, it appears the high-technology industries may have become 
more dominant in several MSA’s, as the MSA with the highest percent employed in high-
technology industries was only 35% in 1990, 7% lower than that in 2000. 
In contrast, proportions of earners in the creative class increased across the board 
from 1990 to 2000. Using the comparable measure, the average MSA had 31.60% 
working in creative class occupations with 10.96% in the super creative core in 1990. 
These figures increased to an average of 33.38% in the creative class in each MSA and 
12.50% in the super creative core. Using the more standard measure of the creative class, 
we see slightly higher numbers in 2000, with an average of 36.96% of workers in each 
MSA employed in creative class occupations. Using this standard measure, we see that 
by 2000, some MSA’s economies were dominated by the creative class, with some 
having nearly 60% of the workforce employed in creative class occupations. Even 
MSA’s with the lowest proportion of workers in the creative class had nearly a quarter of 
its workforce employed in these occupations. 
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The next descriptive indicators of interest are those which assess inequality across 
MSA’s, as we are interested in the extent to which inequality varies across MSA’s. In 
1990 we see that the average 90/20 earnings ratio was 4.03. This indicates that on 
average, earners in the 90
th
 percentile earned about four times as much as earners in the 
20
th
 percentile across MSA’s. This ratio ranged from 3.04 to 5.17 in 1990. In 2000, the 
average for this ratio was exactly the same across MSA’s, but the range across MSAs was 
quite different. This ratio had dropped in some MSA’s, with the lowest being 2.98, but 
the ratio had increased in others. In one MSA in particular (the high-earning Stamford, 
CT), the 90/20 earnings ratio had jumped all the way to 16.09. 
The next indicator of inequality is the Gini coefficient. Unlike the 90/20 earnings 
ratio, the Gini reports an increase in average MSA inequality from 1990 to 2000 as the 
index increased from .369 in 1990 to .383 in 2000. Again, what’s most interesting with 
this measure is that the range increased during this decade. In 1990 the Gini ranged from 
.304 to .423 in 1990 but widened by 2000, as it stretched from .330 to .539. 
Looking at the percent of low earners in the workforce, we see that the average 
percent dropped from 4.37% in 1990 to 3.97% by 2000. The range for this measure also 
decreased between 1990 and 2000, as it ranged from 1 to 22% in 1990, but only 1 to 19% 
in 2000. 
The last descriptive question asked here is what important changes may be 
observed among these characteristics between 1990 and 2000? While the averages of 
these indicators across MSA’s have not seen dramatic fluctuations, the ranges of many of 
these indicators have expanded noticeably. While low earner rates lowered during this 
period, with the ranges being suppressed as well, other indicators of inequality saw 
increases in their range between 1990 and 2000. Both the 90/20 earnings ratio and the 
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Gini coefficient saw increases in their range. This suggests that while economic growth 
during this period may have helped reduce low earner rates, inequality continued to grow. 
Also from this data, we see that there have only been modest changes in the 
average of employment in these sectors between 1990 and 2000. However, one should 
also note that the range in these indicators has grown more substantially. In fact, the most 
compelling finding here is the dramatic ranges seen in some of these indicators across 
MSA’s. By 2000 we see that some MSA’s were deeply involved in the new economy, by 
whatever measure one chooses. At the same time, others existed with very small 
proportions employed in high-technology industries or working in super creative core 
occupations. Employment in high-technology industries has come to represent more than 
two fifths of all employment in some MSA’s by 2000. Also, by 2000 nearly three fifths 




We see a wide variation in many of the MSA-level characteristics which are of 
interest to this study. Median earnings, levels of inequality, and proportions of 
employment in new economy sectors vary widely. In the next chapter, we will see how 






















TABLE 4.1 MSA-Level Descriptive Statistics (2000) N=225  
 
Variable  Mean SD Min Max 
Mean of MA Median Earnings  28,964 4,108 17,000 46,700 
% High-Tech Industry  12.60 4.78 5 40 
% High-Tech Industry (Comp)  12.87 4.88 5 42 
% Creative Class Occupations  36.96 6.31 24 59 
% Creative Class Occs. (Comp)  33.38 5.69 22 56 
% Creative Core Occupations  13.45 3.32 8 26 
% Creative Core Occs. (Comp)  12.50 2.72 8 25 
90/20 Earnings Ratio  4.03 .93 2.98 16.09 
Gini Coefficient  .383 0.03 .330 .539 
% Low Earner  3.97 2.03 1 19 
% Bachelor’s Degree or More  28.46 7.83 14 58 
% More than Bachelor’s Degree  9.86 3.99 4 26 
% Geographically Mobile  30.34 4.03 9 39 
% Government Employee  18.47 5.91 9 38 
% Non-profit Employee  8.62 2.57 2 29 
Age  40.85 .61 38.46 42.63 
Male  51.73 1.88 46 59 
Married  66.14 3.99 57 77 
One or More Children  53.86 4.27 43 70 
White, non-Hispanic  78.64 15.04 10 98 
Black, non-Hispanic  8.71 8.72 0 41 
Hispanic  8.59 13.21 0 88 














TABLE 4.2 MSA-Level Data Descriptive Statistics (1990). N=225  
 
Variable  Mean SD Min Max 
Mean of MA Median Earnings  20,613 2,941 12,000 30,000 
% High-Tech Industry (Comp)  13.32 4.94 4 35 
% Creative Class Occs. (Comp)  31.60 5.46 19 49 
% Creative Core Occs. (Comp)  10.96 2.55 6 21 
% Eds and Meds Occs. (Comp)  12.46 2.51 6 24 
90/20 Earnings Ratio  4.03 0.40 3.04 5.17 
Gini Coefficient  0.369 0.019 0.304 0.423 
% Low Earner  4.37 2.54 1 22 
% Bachelor’s Degree or More  25.05 6.94 12 47 
% More than Bachelor’s Degree  8.70 3.53 3 23 
% Geographically Mobile  31.27 5.82 0 41 
% Government Employee  19.42 6.93 8 44 
Male  52.85 2.11 45 62 
Married  69.55 4.51 57 80 
One or More Children  57.55 4.79 41 73 
White, non-Hispanic  83.12 13.54 14 99 
Black, non-Hispanic  8.27 5.25 0 46 
Hispanic  6.40 11.80 0 85 

















TABLE 4.3 Individual-Level Descriptive Statistics (2000). N=2,943,194 
 
Variable  Mean SD Min Max 
Earnings  40,138.08 40,644 4 354,000 
Earnings (Ln)  10.27 0.87 1.39 3,481 
Bachelor’s Degree or More  0.33 0.47 0 1 
More than Bachelor’s Degree  0.12 0.32 0 1 
Geographically Mobile  0.32 0.47 0 1 
Creative Class  0.40 0.49 0 1 
Creative Class (comparable)  0.37 0.48 0 1 
Creative Core   0.15 0.35 0 1 
Creative Core (comparable)  0.13 0.34 0 1 
High-Technology  0.15 0.36 0 1 
High-Technology (comparable)  0.16 0.36 0 1 
Government Employee  0.17 0.38 0 1 
Non-profit Employee  0.08 0.28 0 1 
Worked less than 40 hours/week  0.18 0.38 0 1 
Worked less than 26 weeks   0.05 0.23 0 1 
Male  0.52 0.50 0 1 
Age  40.63 9.29 25 59 
Married  0.64 0.48 0 1 
Children, one or more  0.52 0.50 0 1 
Black  0.11 0.31 1 1 
Hispanic  0.11 0.32 0 1 
Other  0.06 0.24 0 1 

















































































































































Stamford, CT 46700 26 27 59 56 16 14 58 26 24 
San Jose, CA 45000 40 42 54 46 26 19 49 20 30 
Danbury, CT 43000 22 22 53 50 17 15 50 19 20 
Washington, DC/MD/VA 40000 18 19 54 49 22 18 49 22 34 
San Francisco-Oakland-Vallejo, 
CA 39800 21 22 48 43 18 15 45 16 29 
Ann Arbor, MI 39000 13 13 50 46 23 21 46 21 25 
Monmouth-Ocean, NJ 38000 17 18 45 40 16 14 36 12 26 
Trenton, NJ 38000 18 18 49 44 20 18 43 20 24 
Boston, MA-NH 37000 22 23 51 46 19 17 48 20 31 
Bridgeport, CT 37000 20 20 44 41 14 13 38 16 26 
New York-Northeastern NJ 36000 16 17 44 40 15 14 40 17 28 
Seattle-Everett, WA 36000 23 23 47 42 18 15 42 14 35 
Detroit, MI 35800 11 11 38 34 14 13 29 11 35 
Wilmington, DE/NJ/MD 35500 25 25 45 41 17 15 36 13 30 
Baltimore, MD 35000 14 14 45 41 17 15 37 15 32 
Chicago, IL 35000 16 17 41 38 14 12 37 13 36 
Hartford-Bristol-Middleton- New 
Britain, CT 35000 15 16 44 39 15 14 38 15 30 
Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN 35000 17 18 44 39 16 14 37 11 34 
Nashua, NH 35000 29 29 47 41 20 16 37 12 20 
New Haven-Meriden, CT 35000 15 15 43 39 17 16 37 18 25 
Philadelphia, PA/NJ 35000 17 17 43 39 15 14 36 13 31 
Ventura-Oxnard-Simi Valley, CA 35000 18 19 41 38 15 14 31 10 31 
Brockton, MA 34000 14 14 38 34 12 11 28 8 20 
Santa Rosa-Petaluma, CA 34000 14 14 40 36 14 13 31 9 32 
Atlanta, GA 33000 17 18 44 40 15 13 38 12 35 
Galveston-Texas City, TX 33000 19 18 42 38 16 15 29 10 26 
Hamilton-Middleton, OH 33000 15 14 40 36 14 13 29 10 28 
Milwaukee, WI 33000 15 17 41 37 14 13 33 10 37 
Sacramento, CA 33000 14 14 43 39 16 14 33 10 35 
Worcester, MA 33000 16 16 42 38 16 14 37 14 25 
Lansing-E. Lansing, MI 32700 7 7 37 34 15 14 30 12 30 
Racine, WI 32050 14 15 34 31 12 11 24 7 26 
Austin, TX 32000 23 23 49 43 21 17 42 14 35 
Bloomington-Normal, IL 32000 8 8 43 39 17 15 39 11 30 
Bremerton, WA 32000 12 10 40 36 16 15 30 9 24 
Columbus, OH 32000 15 15 42 38 15 13 35 11 37 
Dallas-Fort Worth, TX 32000 20 20 42 38 15 13 33 10 36 
Kansas City, MO-KS 32000 16 15 41 37 14 12 34 11 34 
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TABLE 4.4 CONTINUED 
Kenosha, WI 32000 17 18 32 30 12 11 23 7 26 
Madison, WI 32000 12 12 49 43 20 18 43 16 32 
Portland, OR-WA 32000 17 17 40 37 15 13 34 11 37 
Raleigh-Durham, NC 32000 23 23 49 43 21 17 44 16 31 
Santa Cruz, CA 32000 19 19 45 41 20 18 38 14 30 
Rochester, MN 31800 16 15 47 37 17 14 36 12 24 
Tacoma, WA 31800 13 13 34 31 12 11 25 8 28 
Olympia, WA 31500 8 7 41 37 15 14 34 13 28 
Indianapolis, IN 31200 14 14 39 34 12 11 31 10 37 
Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY 31100 11 12 43 38 16 14 35 15 31 
Cincinnati-Hamilton, OH/KY/IN 31100 15 15 40 36 14 12 32 11 34 
Des Moines, IA 31000 10 10 43 38 14 13 34 9 32 
Houston-Brazoria, TX 31000 18 19 40 36 15 14 31 10 36 
Richmond-Petersburg, VA 31000 15 15 43 39 14 13 36 12 33 
San Diego, CA 30900 17 17 43 38 16 15 35 12 39 
Cleveland, OH 30600 14 15 37 34 12 11 30 11 34 
St. Louis, MO-IL 30300 15 15 39 35 14 12 31 11 36 
Cedar Rapids, IA 30200 22 23 39 35 15 13 30 7 32 
Jackson, MI 30200 10 12 31 29 11 11 22 6 28 
Grand Rapids, MI 30150 11 10 35 32 13 12 29 9 34 
Akron, OH 30000 13 14 37 33 13 12 29 9 29 
Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, 
PA/NJ 30000 15 15 35 31 13 12 26 9 28 
Appleton-Oshkosh-Neenah, WI 30000 10 12 32 28 12 11 25 6 30 
Atlantic City, NJ 30000 6 6 31 29 11 10 25 7 30 
Birmingham, AL 30000 15 15 41 37 13 12 34 11 33 
Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock Hill, NC-
SC 30000 17 17 38 35 13 12 32 9 31 
Dayton-Springfield, OH 30000 12 13 37 33 13 12 27 10 35 
Decatur, IL 30000 11 10 31 27 11 10 22 7 30 
Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood-
Pompano Beach, FL 30000 11 13 41 37 11 11 30 10 31 
Green Bay, WI 30000 11 10 33 30 12 11 26 6 33 
Harrisburg-Lebanon--Carlisle, PA 30000 10 10 34 30 12 11 25 9 28 
Janesville-Beloit, WI 30000 10 11 27 25 9 9 19 6 28 
Kalamazoo-Portage, MI 30000 11 12 33 30 12 11 25 9 31 
Lancaster, PA 30000 12 11 30 27 10 10 24 8 29 
Lincoln, NE 30000 14 15 44 39 17 15 40 12 37 
Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA 30000 14 16 39 36 15 13 32 11 38 
Louisville, KY/IN 30000 11 11 39 35 12 11 32 12 35 
Memphis, TN/AR/MS 30000 12 11 39 35 13 12 31 10 36 
Nashville, TN 30000 11 12 40 36 13 12 32 10 35 
Omaha, NE/IA 30000 13 15 42 37 15 12 36 11 27 
Peoria, IL 30000 8 9 37 33 14 13 26 8 31 
Phoenix, AZ 30000 17 18 40 36 14 12 30 10 38 
Providence-Fall River-Pawtucket, 
MA/RI 30000 12 13 36 33 13 12 29 10 31 
Provo-Orem, UT 30000 14 17 45 39 19 15 34 10 34 
Reading, PA 30000 17 16 32 28 12 11 23 7 27 
Reno, NV 30000 9 10 34 32 10 9 27 8 35 
Richland-Kennewick-Pasco, WA 30000 21 14 39 36 18 17 28 11 30 
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TABLE 4.4 CONTINUED 
Riverside-San Bernardino,CA 30000 10 10 33 30 11 11 21 7 34 
Rochester, NY 30000 20 14 41 36 17 16 33 13 33 
Rockford, IL 30000 15 18 33 30 11 11 23 7 31 
Salt Lake City-Ogden, UT 30000 14 15 40 36 15 13 30 10 35 
Santa Barbara-Santa Maria-
Lompoc, CA 30000 14 14 39 36 17 16 33 13 34 
Santa Fe, NM 30000 10 8 51 47 23 20 45 21 24 
Sheboygan, WI 30000 11 10 29 27 12 11 22 6 28 
Springfield-Holyoke-Chicopee, 
MA 30000 10 11 38 35 16 15 32 13 32 
Stockton, CA 30000 11 11 31 29 11 11 19 5 30 
Toledo, OH/MI 30000 9 9 33 30 12 11 25 9 35 
Waterbury, CT 30000 13 14 28 24 9 8 20 7 27 
West Palm Beach-Boca Raton-
Delray Beach, FL 30000 13 13 41 38 13 12 31 10 31 
Wichita, KS 30000 27 27 36 33 14 13 29 8 35 
York, PA 30000 14 14 32 28 11 10 22 7 26 
South Bend-Mishawaka, IN 29900 9 10 36 33 14 13 30 11 28 
Champaign-Urbana-Rantoul, IL 29850 9 9 46 41 23 21 39 19 30 
Saginaw-Bay City-Midland, MI 29800 14 15 30 27 12 11 22 6 28 
Greeley, CO 29600 14 15 33 29 12 11 24 7 25 
Manchester, NH 29600 16 16 35 32 12 12 26 7 28 
Syracuse, NY 29400 14 14 37 34 15 14 28 12 31 
Fort Wayne, IN 29300 13 13 33 29 11 10 23 8 33 
Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY 29200 12 12 37 34 13 13 31 12 32 
Colorado Springs, CO 29200 22 19 43 37 19 16 35 13 30 
Baton Rouge, LA 29000 17 16 38 34 14 13 29 10 33 
Columbia, SC 29000 12 11 43 38 15 14 35 13 30 
Jacksonville, FL 29000 12 13 38 35 12 11 26 8 32 
Lafayette-W. Lafayette, IN 29000 11 12 37 34 17 16 31 14 31 
Las Vegas, NV 29000 7 7 28 28 8 8 20 6 36 
Lexington-Fayette, KY 29000 13 13 46 42 17 16 43 18 33 
Modesto, CA 29000 7 7 30 27 11 11 20 5 32 
Duluth-Superior, MN/WI 28800 8 8 33 29 12 12 27 8 23 
Pittsburgh, PA 28600 14 14 37 34 12 11 31 11 25 
Hagerstown, MD 28550 11 11 29 26 10 9 19 7 26 
Beaumont-Port Arthur-Orange,TX 28500 18 18 32 28 11 11 20 5 29 
Wausau, WI 28450 9 9 33 29 11 10 21 6 26 
Davenport, IA-Rock Island -
Moline, IL 28100 8 8 34 31 12 11 26 8 19 
Bellingham, WA 28000 11 10 34 32 12 11 29 9 30 
Benton Harbor, MI 28000 12 12 32 30 12 11 24 9 27 
Decatur, AL 28000 17 16 28 26 10 10 19 5 30 
Elkhart-Goshen, IN 28000 7 7 27 25 9 9 19 7 32 
Greensboro-Winston Salem-High 
Point, NC 28000 12 12 34 31 11 10 26 8 31 
Greenville-Spartanburg-Anderson 
SC 28000 13 13 34 31 12 11 26 9 30 
Lima, OH 28000 12 11 28 25 10 9 17 6 28 
Macon-Warner Robins, GA 28000 9 9 36 31 12 11 25 8 32 
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TABLE 4.4 CONTINUED 
Melbourne-Titusville-Cocoa-Palm 
Bay, FL 28000 22 21 41 36 17 15 29 10 29 
New Bedford, MA 28000 10 10 30 28 11 11 22 7 27 
Norfolk-VA Beach--Newport 
News, VA 28000 11 10 39 36 15 14 29 10 35 
Orlando, FL 28000 13 13 40 36 13 11 30 9 33 
Savannah, GA 28000 12 12 38 35 13 12 31 11 30 
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, 
FL 28000 14 15 40 35 12 11 27 9 35 
Tuscaloosa, AL 28000 8 8 36 33 16 15 30 13 31 
Vineland-Milville-Bridgetown, NJ 28000 7 8 26 23 10 10 17 4 28 
St. Cloud, MN 27700 9 10 31 29 11 11 22 7 24 
Chattanooga, TN/GA 27650 11 10 37 33 12 11 26 8 9 
Boise City, ID 27600 18 18 38 35 14 13 30 9 33 
State College, PA 27400 12 13 41 38 21 19 36 17 25 
Montgomery, AL 27350 10 9 40 36 14 13 32 12 33 
Salem, OR 27350 9 9 34 31 11 11 24 7 32 
Albuquerque, NM 27300 17 17 42 38 16 15 33 13 33 
Augusta-Aiken, GA-SC 27000 15 15 37 33 14 13 26 9 30 
Bakersfield, CA 27000 9 11 30 27 12 12 19 6 36 
Bloomington, IN 27000 8 8 48 45 25 25 49 25 28 
Bryan-College Station, TX 27000 9 10 48 45 24 22 44 21 32 
Canton, OH 27000 9 10 29 26 10 9 21 7 30 
Erie, PA 27000 9 10 30 28 11 11 25 9 31 
Knoxville, TN 27000 13 12 39 35 14 13 31 12 32 
Little Rock--North Little Rock, AR 27000 12 13 38 33 12 11 29 9 34 
Muncie, IN 27000 7 8 34 31 13 13 26 11 28 
New Orleans, LA 27000 12 13 37 34 13 12 29 10 30 
Spokane, WA 27000 11 11 38 34 12 12 31 11 33 
Tyler, TX 27000 13 13 36 32 10 10 26 8 30 
Waterloo-Cedar Falls, IA 27000 6 8 35 31 13 12 26 8 27 
Youngstown-Warren, OH-PA 27000 8 9 27 24 9 9 20 6 30 
Jackson, MS 26650 12 11 40 36 13 12 33 11 36 
Charleston-N.Charleston,SC 26600 9 8 38 35 13 12 32 11 28 
Columbia, MO 26500 10 9 48 43 18 17 46 19 32 
Eau Claire, WI 26450 12 12 30 27 11 10 23 7 27 
Redding, CA 26450 8 7 36 34 13 13 24 7 30 
Eugene-Springfield, OR 26400 11 11 37 34 15 14 29 10 35 
Binghamton, NY 26300 19 20 38 33 16 14 27 12 28 
Houma-Thibodoux, LA 26200 7 18 29 25 9 8 14 4 29 
Sarasota, FL 26200 10 11 37 33 11 10 26 8 31 
Scranton-Wilkes-Barre, PA 26100 11 11 32 28 10 10 24 8 26 
Utica-Rome, NY 26100 11 11 33 30 12 12 23 9 27 
Amarillo, TX 26000 9 10 36 32 13 12 26 8 36 
Biloxi-Gulfport, MS 26000 8 8 32 31 11 11 22 7 30 
Fort Myers-Cape Coral, FL 26000 8 8 34 31 9 9 22 7 28 
Gainesville, FL 26000 9 7 49 44 22 21 42 20 29 
Longview-Marshall, TX 26000 15 17 32 28 11 10 23 7 29 
Mansfield, OH 26000 13 14 26 24 9 9 15 5 30 
Odessa, TX 26000 13 22 35 32 12 12 22 5 33 
San Antonio, TX 26000 12 12 39 35 13 13 28 10 34 
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Tucson, AZ 26000 14 14 39 36 16 15 31 12 34 
Lafayette, LA 25650 10 20 37 33 12 12 27 8 30 
Lakeland-Winterhaven, FL 25300 8 8 31 27 10 9 19 6 31 
Mobile, AL 25200 13 13 33 30 12 11 24 8 32 
Chico, CA 25100 7 7 36 33 14 14 28 8 31 
Sharon, PA 25100 9 9 29 27 8 8 23 7 21 
Altoona, PA 25000 9 9 28 26 8 8 18 6 26 
Anniston, AL 25000 8 8 29 26 11 11 20 9 28 
Asheville, NC 25000 14 14 35 32 11 11 28 9 29 
Billings, MT 25000 12 13 37 34 11 11 33 7 30 
Clarksville- Hopkinsville, TN/KY 25000 10 10 31 29 12 12 22 7 28 
Daytona Beach, FL 25000 9 10 34 31 10 10 21 7 29 
Fayetteville, NC 25000 8 8 34 30 13 13 22 7 26 
Fayetteville-Springdale, AR 25000 9 8 35 30 11 10 24 8 34 
Florence, AL 25000 12 11 31 28 11 11 23 9 31 
Fort Pierce, FL 25000 11 11 34 31 10 10 22 7 27 
Fresno, CA 25000 7 6 32 30 12 12 22 7 36 
Hickory-Morgantown, NC 25000 10 9 24 22 8 8 16 5 29 
Jamestown-Dunkirk, NY 25000 7 8 29 27 12 12 20 8 26 
Johnson City-Kingsport--Bristol, 
TN/VA 25000 17 17 32 28 11 10 23 8 30 
Kileen-Temple, TX 25000 8 8 35 31 13 13 22 7 29 
Lubbock, TX 25000 10 10 40 37 14 14 30 10 34 
Medford, OR 25000 9 10 36 33 14 13 26 9 34 
Monroe, LA 25000 8 9 34 30 11 11 27 9 32 
Pensacola, FL 25000 11 11 37 32 12 11 25 8 31 
Shreveport, LA 25000 9 10 33 31 11 11 23 8 34 
Springfield, MO 25000 11 11 33 30 11 11 26 8 36 
Terre Haute, IN 25000 12 11 29 26 11 11 21 9 29 
Waco, TX 25000 10 12 32 29 12 12 21 7 34 
Williamsport, PA 25000 11 11 25 22 9 8 18 5 26 
Wilmington, NC 25000 15 14 36 33 12 11 28 8 27 
Yuba City, CA 25000 8 8 29 26 11 11 17 4 29 
Yakima, WA 24100 7 6 29 27 11 11 19 7 34 
Danville, VA 24000 7 7 25 22 9 8 15 6 27 
Ocala, FL 24000 9 8 33 30 9 9 17 6 28 
Wichita Falls, TX 24000 9 10 32 29 12 12 25 7 31 
Merced, CA 23800 6 6 28 24 11 11 15 4 29 
Joplin, MO 23400 11 12 30 27 9 9 20 7 31 
Abilene, TX 23000 9 10 36 33 12 13 26 8 29 
Alexandria, LA 23000 7 6 34 30 11 11 21 6 30 
Johnstown, PA 23000 8 8 27 24 8 8 17 5 22 
Jacksonville, NC 22000 6 7 33 30 12 13 19 6 22 
Visalia-Tulare-Porterville, CA 22000 5 5 26 23 10 10 15 5 34 
Yuma, AZ 22000 5 5 28 26 11 11 16 6 33 
El Paso, TX 21000 8 9 33 30 13 13 22 7 33 
Las Cruces, NM 20100 9 8 37 34 17 17 28 11 31 
Brownsville-Harlingen-San Benito, 
TX 18600 6 6 33 30 14 14 20 7 31 
McAllen-Edinburg-Pharr-Mission, 
TX 17000 5 6 31 29 14 14 20 6 30 
 67 













































































Stamford, CT 46700 58.06 26.31 16.09 0.539 2.29 
San Jose, CA 45000 48.57 20.29 4.96 0.431 2.11 
Danbury, CT 43000 49.75 18.96 5.15 0.477 1.72 
Washington, DC/MD/VA 40000 48.92 22.11 4.29 0.395 2.08 
San Francisco-Oakland-
Vallejo, CA 39800 44.94 16.44 4.60 0.427 2.48 
Ann Arbor, MI 39000 46.34 20.89 4.25 0.394 2.05 
Monmouth-Ocean, NJ 38000 36.26 12.18 4.51 0.421 1.94 
Trenton, NJ 38000 43.29 19.71 4.50 0.432 2.61 
Boston, MA-NH 37000 47.59 20.19 4.30 0.421 2.15 
Bridgeport, CT 37000 37.73 15.84 4.35 0.457 2.52 
New York-Northeastern NJ 36000 40.19 16.58 4.83 0.446 3.52 
Seattle-Everett, WA 36000 42.02 13.63 3.80 0.394 2.29 
Detroit, MI 35800 29.47 10.70 4.44 0.398 3.01 
Wilmington, DE/NJ/MD 35500 36.44 13.43 3.75 0.377 1.97 
Baltimore, MD 35000 36.72 14.99 3.70 0.378 2.24 
Chicago, IL 35000 36.82 13.49 4.44 0.414 2.78 
Hartford-Bristol-Middleton- 
New Britain, CT 35000 37.59 15.16 3.75 0.403 2.58 
Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN 35000 37.21 11.27 3.60 0.380 2.00 
Nashua, NH 35000 36.61 12.24 4.00 0.368 1.34 
New Haven-Meriden, CT 35000 37.36 18.45 3.55 0.382 2.40 
Philadelphia, PA/NJ 35000 35.65 13.13 3.95 0.398 2.61 
Ventura-Oxnard-Simi 
Valley, CA 35000 31.04 10.36 5.00 0.423 3.54 
Brockton, MA 34000 27.85 8.27 3.42 0.350 1.71 
Santa Rosa-Petaluma, CA 34000 31.40 9.07 4.31 0.393 2.67 
Atlanta, GA 33000 37.67 12.25 4.18 0.407 2.95 
Galveston-Texas City, TX 33000 28.83 10.00 4.36 0.390 4.17 
Hamilton-Middleton, OH 33000 28.80 10.01 3.72 0.373 2.13 
Milwaukee, WI 33000 33.40 10.27 3.60 0.383 2.74 
Sacramento, CA 33000 32.63 9.85 3.91 0.381 3.59 
Worcester, MA 33000 36.59 13.83 3.72 0.363 2.36 
Lansing-E. Lansing, MI 32700 30.00 11.52 3.72 0.358 2.76 
Racine, WI 32050 24.34 7.32 3.56 0.366 1.36 
Austin, TX 32000 42.26 14.20 4.28 0.418 3.12 
Bloomington-Normal, IL 32000 38.66 10.87 3.68 0.367 2.39 
Bremerton, WA 32000 29.96 8.88 4.06 0.379 3.18 
Columbus, OH 32000 35.00 11.47 3.72 0.379 2.75 
Dallas-Fort Worth, TX 32000 33.39 10.04 4.45 0.419 3.43 
Kansas City, MO-KS 32000 33.97 10.89 3.72 0.370 2.21 
Kenosha, WI 32000 22.59 7.17 3.61 0.351 2.35 
 68 
TABLE 4.5 CONTINUED 
Madison, WI 32000 42.97 16.41 3.23 0.356 1.92 
Portland, OR-WA 32000 34.37 10.96 4.12 0.389 3.25 
Raleigh-Durham, NC 32000 43.75 15.60 4.17 0.391 2.76 
Santa Cruz, CA 32000 38.23 13.72 5.87 0.450 4.22 
Rochester, MN 31800 35.74 12.35 3.71 0.385 1.66 
Tacoma, WA 31800 25.02 7.79 3.65 0.359 3.31 
Olympia, WA 31500 33.69 12.87 3.57 0.364 3.41 
Indianapolis, IN 31200 30.84 9.99 3.78 0.374 2.50 
Albany-Schenectady-Troy, 
NY 31100 34.97 15.28 3.61 0.365 2.34 
Cincinnati-Hamilton, 
OH/KY/IN 31100 31.52 11.21 3.89 0.396 2.53 
Des Moines, IA 31000 34.50 9.28 3.28 0.365 1.69 
Houston-Brazoria, TX 31000 31.39 10.18 4.69 0.425 4.57 
Richmond-Petersburg, VA 31000 36.17 11.65 3.72 0.384 2.52 
San Diego, CA 30900 35.18 12.36 4.80 0.420 4.32 
Cleveland, OH 30600 29.72 10.54 3.88 0.392 3.01 
St. Louis, MO-IL 30300 30.80 10.84 3.78 0.384 2.75 
Cedar Rapids, IA 30200 30.42 7.40 3.44 0.352 2.17 
Jackson, MI 30200 21.53 6.39 3.55 0.350 2.65 
Grand Rapids, MI 30150 28.52 8.70 3.69 0.374 2.68 
Akron, OH 30000 29.01 9.17 3.90 0.386 3.10 
Allentown-Bethlehem-
Easton, PA/NJ 30000 26.39 9.17 3.89 0.372 2.48 
Appleton-Oshkosh-Neenah, 
WI 30000 24.90 6.39 3.18 0.330 1.65 
Atlantic City, NJ 30000 25.33 6.89 3.75 0.375 3.27 
Birmingham, AL 30000 33.86 11.30 4.05 0.401 3.47 
Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock 
Hill, NC-SC 30000 31.51 8.80 3.83 0.401 2.66 
Dayton-Springfield, OH 30000 27.03 10.15 3.75 0.368 3.02 
Decatur, IL 30000 21.69 6.66 4.00 0.375 3.22 
Fort Lauderdale-
Hollywood-Pompano 
Beach, FL 30000 30.37 10.21 4.38 0.407 4.07 
Green Bay, WI 30000 26.27 5.87 3.33 0.366 2.00 
Harrisburg-Lebanon--
Carlisle, PA 30000 25.33 8.75 3.47 0.354 2.53 
Janesville-Beloit, WI 30000 19.29 6.16 3.33 0.342 1.46 
Kalamazoo-Portage, MI 30000 25.24 8.62 3.79 0.374 3.41 
Lancaster, PA 30000 24.29 7.56 3.56 0.357 2.23 
Lincoln, NE 30000 39.63 12.15 3.41 0.361 3.01 
Los Angeles-Long Beach, 
CA 30000 32.05 10.66 5.36 0.445 5.67 
Louisville, KY/IN 30000 31.53 11.86 3.96 0.393 2.94 
Memphis, TN/AR/MS 30000 30.96 10.47 4.00 0.409 4.51 
Nashville, TN 30000 31.99 9.61 3.61 0.386 2.76 
Omaha, NE/IA 30000 35.78 10.66 3.72 0.378 2.51 
Peoria, IL 30000 26.13 8.45 4.00 0.374 2.68 
Phoenix, AZ 30000 30.28 9.61 4.12 0.396 3.92 
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Providence-Fall River-
Pawtucket, MA/RI 30000 28.75 10.12 3.75 0.368 2.84 
Provo-Orem, UT 30000 33.83 9.74 4.89 0.405 3.98 
Reading, PA 30000 22.52 6.85 3.47 0.353 2.22 
Reno, NV 30000 26.84 8.08 3.88 0.390 3.45 
Richland-Kennewick-
Pasco, WA 30000 28.42 10.52 4.64 0.388 4.68 
Riverside-San 
Bernardino,CA 30000 20.61 6.88 4.45 0.389 5.48 
Rochester, NY 30000 32.88 13.39 3.94 0.373 3.15 
Rockford, IL 30000 22.60 6.79 3.79 0.367 2.97 
Salt Lake City-Ogden, UT 30000 30.27 9.90 4.06 0.384 2.83 
Santa Barbara-Santa Maria-
Lompoc, CA 30000 33.36 12.57 5.00 0.433 4.61 
Santa Fe, NM 30000 44.60 21.38 4.87 0.402 4.04 
Sheboygan, WI 30000 22.03 5.52 3.22 0.333 1.27 
Springfield-Holyoke-
Chicopee, MA 30000 31.80 13.03 3.66 0.360 3.45 
Stockton, CA 30000 18.65 5.28 4.33 0.382 5.40 
Toledo, OH/MI 30000 25.11 8.82 3.91 0.374 3.54 
Waterbury, CT 30000 19.79 6.66 3.59 0.341 4.31 
West Palm Beach-Boca 
Raton-Delray Beach, FL 30000 31.44 9.95 4.50 0.427 3.72 
Wichita, KS 30000 29.09 8.45 3.61 0.346 2.94 
York, PA 30000 22.23 6.84 3.28 0.337 1.96 
South Bend-Mishawaka, IN 29900 29.66 11.40 3.75 0.369 2.91 
Champaign-Urbana-
Rantoul, IL 29850 39.31 19.39 3.69 0.366 3.49 
Saginaw-Bay City-Midland, 
MI 29800 21.57 6.29 4.48 0.383 3.37 
Greeley, CO 29600 24.28 7.06 3.63 0.362 3.49 
Manchester, NH 29600 26.33 7.29 3.41 0.344 2.41 
Syracuse, NY 29400 28.05 11.57 3.80 0.371 3.55 
Fort Wayne, IN 29300 22.85 7.61 3.53 0.356 2.81 
Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY 29200 30.61 12.26 4.27 0.387 3.24 
Colorado Springs, CO 29200 34.93 12.60 4.13 0.391 2.85 
Baton Rouge, LA 29000 28.80 10.31 4.13 0.379 4.84 
Columbia, SC 29000 35.34 12.64 3.64 0.372 3.84 
Jacksonville, FL 29000 26.24 7.94 3.78 0.393 3.54 
Lafayette-W. Lafayette, IN 29000 31.29 13.86 3.75 0.375 4.13 
Las Vegas, NV 29000 19.79 6.18 3.53 0.373 3.63 
Lexington-Fayette, KY 29000 42.59 17.52 4.19 0.412 4.28 
Modesto, CA 29000 19.61 5.44 4.41 0.389 5.26 
Duluth-Superior, MN/WI 28800 26.75 8.37 3.93 0.366 3.57 
Pittsburgh, PA 28600 31.15 10.91 4.20 0.403 3.19 
Hagerstown, MD 28550 19.11 7.38 3.40 0.341 3.06 
Beaumont-Port Arthur-
Orange,TX 28500 19.98 4.83 4.43 0.379 5.71 
Wausau, WI 28450 21.26 5.61 2.98 0.343 1.87 
Davenport, IA-Rock Island 
-Moline, IL 28100 25.52 8.01 4.00 0.372 3.39 
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Bellingham, WA 28000 28.97 8.76 4.21 0.371 4.57 
Benton Harbor, MI 28000 23.71 8.95 4.00 0.393 3.95 
Decatur, AL 28000 19.29 5.13 4.00 0.377 3.69 
Elkhart-Goshen, IN 28000 18.51 6.66 3.25 0.359 2.61 
Greensboro-Winston 
Salem-High Point, NC 28000 26.50 7.73 3.73 0.378 3.15 
Greenville-Spartanburg-
Anderson SC 28000 25.98 8.54 3.85 0.378 3.69 
Lima, OH 28000 16.84 5.70 3.67 0.343 2.61 
Macon-Warner Robins, GA 28000 24.79 8.49 3.80 0.376 4.91 
Melbourne-Titusville-
Cocoa-Palm Bay, FL 28000 29.16 9.57 4.25 0.389 3.98 
New Bedford, MA 28000 21.97 7.05 3.73 0.374 4.27 
Norfolk-VA Beach--
Newport News, VA 28000 28.90 10.23 3.93 0.383 3.83 
Orlando, FL 28000 29.95 8.61 4.00 0.401 3.50 
Savannah, GA 28000 30.84 10.92 4.08 0.404 4.33 
Tampa-St. Petersburg-
Clearwater, FL 28000 27.34 8.60 3.97 0.400 3.79 
Tuscaloosa, AL 28000 30.10 12.89 3.93 0.357 3.47 
Vineland-Milville-
Bridgetown, NJ 28000 16.61 4.36 3.72 0.351 5.01 
St. Cloud, MN 27700 22.33 6.52 3.08 0.333 1.80 
Chattanooga, TN/GA 27650 26.17 8.32 3.69 0.384 3.68 
Boise City, ID 27600 29.52 8.85 4.00 0.383 3.83 
State College, PA 27400 35.76 16.59 3.87 0.374 3.05 
Montgomery, AL 27350 32.23 11.91 4.00 0.376 3.84 
Salem, OR 27350 23.81 7.14 3.67 0.357 4.44 
Albuquerque, NM 27300 32.89 13.30 4.19 0.394 5.03 
Augusta-Aiken, GA-SC 27000 26.02 8.99 4.36 0.384 5.06 
Bakersfield, CA 27000 18.74 5.75 5.08 0.403 7.69 
Bloomington, IN 27000 48.54 25.22 4.44 0.398 5.22 
Bryan-College Station, TX 27000 43.87 20.66 4.75 0.414 6.78 
Canton, OH 27000 20.54 6.55 3.67 0.374 2.97 
Erie, PA 27000 24.68 8.60 3.79 0.358 3.92 
Knoxville, TN 27000 31.50 11.65 4.00 0.388 3.29 
Little Rock--North Little 
Rock, AR 27000 29.19 9.31 3.61 0.376 3.88 
Muncie, IN 27000 25.77 10.80 4.39 0.375 4.74 
New Orleans, LA 27000 28.72 9.88 4.29 0.398 6.10 
Spokane, WA 27000 30.84 10.93 3.93 0.382 4.08 
Tyler, TX 27000 25.87 8.13 3.96 0.384 4.24 
Waterloo-Cedar Falls, IA 27000 26.12 7.81 3.53 0.352 3.48 
Youngstown-Warren, OH-
PA 27000 20.43 6.40 3.93 0.371 3.69 
Jackson, MS 26650 32.98 10.69 3.93 0.392 5.40 
Charleston-
N.Charleston,SC 26600 32.27 11.37 4.00 0.413 5.01 
Columbia, MO 26500 45.92 19.25 3.64 0.374 3.68 
Eau Claire, WI 26450 22.71 6.57 3.34 0.343 2.46 
Redding, CA 26450 24.22 6.76 4.46 0.389 5.04 
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Eugene-Springfield, OR 26400 29.40 10.49 4.09 0.374 4.70 
Binghamton, NY 26300 27.28 12.13 4.29 0.384 4.21 
Houma-Thibodoux, LA 26200 14.47 3.75 4.42 0.383 6.63 
Sarasota, FL 26200 25.78 8.20 4.00 0.404 3.21 
Scranton-Wilkes-Barre, PA 26100 24.27 8.45 3.82 0.371 3.12 
Utica-Rome, NY 26100 23.35 9.06 3.47 0.343 3.92 
Amarillo, TX 26000 25.60 7.95 4.00 0.378 5.25 
Biloxi-Gulfport, MS 26000 21.52 6.71 3.61 0.367 5.14 
Fort Myers-Cape Coral, FL 26000 21.88 6.59 3.53 0.384 4.04 
Gainesville, FL 26000 42.37 20.43 4.00 0.403 5.43 
Longview-Marshall, TX 26000 23.10 7.11 4.15 0.396 5.31 
Mansfield, OH 26000 15.13 4.64 3.55 0.352 3.43 
Odessa, TX 26000 21.86 5.38 4.39 0.398 6.24 
San Antonio, TX 26000 27.83 9.56 4.29 0.401 5.40 
Tucson, AZ 26000 30.87 12.20 4.29 0.399 5.35 
Lafayette, LA 25650 27.43 8.05 4.62 0.410 6.56 
Lakeland-Winterhaven, FL 25300 18.70 5.55 3.47 0.364 4.17 
Mobile, AL 25200 24.01 8.35 4.14 0.394 5.49 
Chico, CA 25100 27.54 7.98 4.83 0.411 7.16 
Sharon, PA 25100 22.82 7.50 3.92 0.359 4.06 
Altoona, PA 25000 17.98 5.53 3.82 0.342 3.75 
Anniston, AL 25000 19.96 8.51 3.63 0.352 3.88 
Asheville, NC 25000 28.30 8.74 3.33 0.376 4.29 
Billings, MT 25000 32.56 6.88 4.23 0.399 4.37 
Clarksville- Hopkinsville, 
TN/KY 25000 22.40 7.49 3.71 0.359 4.18 
Daytona Beach, FL 25000 20.72 6.72 3.71 0.379 4.77 
Fayetteville, NC 25000 22.08 7.30 3.76 0.366 4.77 
Fayetteville-Springdale, AR 25000 23.90 7.54 3.47 0.379 3.96 
Florence, AL 25000 22.82 8.55 4.00 0.377 4.25 
Fort Pierce, FL 25000 21.93 7.23 4.18 0.415 3.84 
Fresno, CA 25000 22.48 6.93 4.75 0.405 8.32 
Hickory-Morgantown, NC 25000 15.97 4.65 3.00 0.332 2.49 
Jamestown-Dunkirk, NY 25000 19.97 8.20 3.85 0.354 4.45 
Johnson City-Kingsport--
Bristol, TN/VA 25000 22.96 7.75 3.80 0.376 3.85 
Kileen-Temple, TX 25000 21.82 7.18 3.67 0.377 4.89 
Lubbock, TX 25000 29.81 10.26 4.16 0.405 5.95 
Medford, OR 25000 26.12 8.52 4.15 0.384 5.68 
Monroe, LA 25000 26.79 8.81 4.08 0.408 7.26 
Pensacola, FL 25000 25.06 8.18 4.31 0.401 4.70 
Shreveport, LA 25000 23.26 7.73 4.23 0.392 6.33 
Springfield, MO 25000 26.41 7.96 3.45 0.373 4.33 
Terre Haute, IN 25000 21.47 8.91 3.86 0.381 3.27 
Waco, TX 25000 20.51 7.02 3.66 0.388 4.65 
Williamsport, PA 25000 17.72 5.25 3.46 0.347 2.99 
Wilmington, NC 25000 28.45 8.03 4.29 0.403 4.95 
Yuba City, CA 25000 16.80 4.49 4.69 0.399 6.69 
Yakima, WA 24100 18.70 6.80 4.07 0.373 7.82 
Danville, VA 24000 15.07 5.58 3.38 0.347 4.75 
Ocala, FL 24000 16.72 5.79 3.51 0.371 5.26 
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Wichita Falls, TX 24000 24.64 6.52 4.08 0.373 5.57 
Merced, CA 23800 14.98 3.75 4.69 0.387 8.70 
Joplin, MO 23400 20.08 6.54 3.54 0.364 4.87 
Abilene, TX 23000 25.92 8.04 4.05 0.389 6.37 
Alexandria, LA 23000 20.91 6.43 4.17 0.385 7.52 
Johnstown, PA 23000 16.64 5.11 3.92 0.367 3.86 
Jacksonville, NC 22000 19.34 6.29 3.67 0.350 5.21 
Visalia-Tulare-Porterville, 
CA 22000 15.06 4.84 5.20 0.410 11.28 
Yuma, AZ 22000 16.04 6.44 4.17 0.384 9.17 
El Paso, TX 21000 22.37 6.84 4.43 0.410 9.86 
Las Cruces, NM 20100 28.47 11.34 4.73 0.406 11.34 
Brownsville-Harlingen-San 
Benito, TX 18600 20.48 6.70 4.73 0.414 14.05 
McAllen-Edinburg-Pharr-


































EARNINGS AND INEQUALITY ACROSS MSA’S: CORRELATION ANALYSIS 
Having established a descriptive understanding of the landscape of MSA-level 
inequality in the previous chapter, this chapter will examine associations between MSA-
level characteristics. In this chapter, I will test the MSA-level hypotheses developed in 
Chapter 2. Each of these hypotheses refers to how MSA-level characteristics are expected 
to be associated to one another in the new urban economy. The analysis described in this 
chapter tests these hypotheses. 
Tests of these hypotheses will provide evidence for how MSA’s work as 
structures of the new urban economy. Chapter4 elaborated the ways in which MSA’s 
vary by earnings, inequality, and presence of workers in the new economy. This chapter 
will examine some of the ways by which those MSA-level characteristics are related with 
each other. 
Broadly, the analysis revealed substantial support for many, but not all, of the 
hypotheses elaborated in this chapter. At the MSA-level, new economy employment is 
found to be associated with median earnings and some indicators of inequality. As we 
will see, the story is a bit more complex for geographic mobility and for patterns of 
change over time. 
5.1 TESTS OF EARNINGS HYPOTHESES 
The first set of hypotheses tests how various MSA-level characteristics relate to 
median earnings. Hypothesis 1A argues that rates of educational attainment will be 
positively associated with earnings at the MSA-level. It should not come as a surprise 
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that strong support for this hypothesis was found. Tables are placed at the end of the 
chapter. As reported in Table 5.1, in 2000, the proportion of earners with at least a 
Bachelor’s degree is strongly positively associated with MSA-level median earnings, 
with an r of 0.687 which is statistically significant at the .01 level. The proportion of 
workers with a degree beyond the Bachelor’s is also strongly and positively associated 
with median earnings, with a correlation of .597 in 2000 (significant at the .01 level). 
This confirms that at that MSA-level, as the proportion of earners with at least a college 
degree increases, the median earnings increases across that MSA. This test functions to 
confirm the correlation between education and earnings functions at the MSA-level and 
gives us a measure of the strength of that correlation.  
Hypothesis 1B examines the association between new economy employment and 
median earnings at the MSA-level. Recall that MSA-level indicators of the new economy 
used here are the proportion of workers in high-technology industries, the proportion of 
workers in creative class occupations, and the proportion of workers in super-creative 
core occupations. Examining the results of the correlation tests using each of these 
indicators, we find support for hypothesis two. Using the standard variable definitions, 
the proportion of workers employed in high-technology industries is found to have a 
strong, positive correlation with median earnings with a correlation of .669. Similarly, the 
correlation between the proportion of workers in the creative class and median earnings is 
found to be .665 and also statistically significant at the .01 level. This association is 
slightly less strong, but still present and significant, for the super creative core. Using 
definitions of these indicators that are comparable between 2000 and 1990, we see very 
similar results. These findings provide support for the second hypothesis. At the MSA-
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level, the proportion of employment in both high-technology industries and creative class 
occupations is strongly associated with higher earnings in those MSA’s. 
 Hypothesis 1C examines the association between the proportion of geographically 
mobile workers in a metropolitan area and median earnings. The results of the correlation 
tests of this hypothesis revealed, however, that there was not a statistically significant 
association between the proportion of workers who had relocated in the previous five 
years and median earnings in metropolitan areas. The result of the correlation test was a 
very weak and not statistically significant r of -.041. This may be because no relationship 
exists between geographic mobility and earnings at the MSA-level or it may be that the 
indicator does not reflect a relationship that does exist. Either way, this test does not 
demonstrate support for the third hypothesis. 
5.2 INEQUALITY HYPOTHESES  
The next set of hypotheses examined relationships between measures of 
educational attainment, new economy employment, and geographic mobility, and 
indicators of inequality at the MSA-level. Results of the correlation tests used to test 
these hypotheses are reported in Table 4.2.  
Hypothesis 2A examines the association between rates of educational attainment 
and the indicators of inequality. These tests revealed varying results. The proportion of 
workers in an MSA with at least a college degree demonstrates a moderate-to-strong, 
positive, and statistically significant correlation with both the Gini coefficient and the 
90/20 earnings ratio. At the same time, this proportion is negatively associated with low 
earner rates. In 2000, the proportion of earners in an MSA with at least a college degree 
has a .338 correlation with the 90/20 earnings ratio and a .523 correlation with the Gini 
coefficient, both of which were statistically significant at the .01 level. In contrast, the 
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proportion of workers with at least a college degree in each MSA has a moderately strong 
negative relationship with MSA-level low earner rates in 2000.  
Using the proportion of workers with degrees beyond a college degree, we see 
very similar results. This measure of educational attainment had a .361 correlation with 
the 90/20 earnings ratio and a .487 correlation with the Gini coefficient, both statistically 
significant at the .01 level. The proportion of individuals in an MSA with a degree 
beyond the college degree has a correlation of -.252 with the low earner rate of employed 
individuals in the MSA.  
From these results we can see that a higher MSA-level rate of educational 
attainment is associated with higher inequality when looking at employed workers in 
MSA’s. This pattern is moderately strong when using the 90/20 earnings ratio as the 
indicator of inequality, but is particularly pronounced when measured by the Gini 
coefficient. At the same time, these higher rates of educational attainment are associated 
with  reduced low earnerrates among those who are employed in those MSA’s. For an 
individual MSA, having higher rates of educational attainment does seem to move 
employed workers out of poverty, but it is also associated with higher levels of overall 
inequality. 
Next, we examine the tests of hypothesis 2B. These tests examine correlations 
between rates of new economy employment and these indicators of inequality. Using the 
standard definitions of high-technology industries and creative class occupations and the 
2000 data, we find support for the fifth hypothesis. Rates of employment in high-
technology industries is positively associated with both the 90/20 earnings ratio and the 
Gini coefficient (.247 and .338, respectively, both statistically significant at the .01 level). 
Rates of employment in the creative class demonstrate even stronger correlations with 
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both indicators of inequality (.345 and .559, respectively, both statistically significant at 
the .01 level). These correlations are more moderate for rates of employment in the super-
creative core, but still moderately strong (.217 and .386 respectively), positive, and 
significant at the .01 level. Consistently, these correlations are stronger for rates of 
employment in the creative class than for rates of employment in high-technology 
industries.  
Interestingly, while these measures of inequality are associated with rates of new 
economy employment, we see very different results for tests involving the low earner 
rate. Each of these indicators of the new economy demonstrate moderate to strong 
correlations with low earner rates at the MSA-level. The proportion of workers  
employed in high-technology industries is has a statistically significant correlation of -
.427 with low earner rates, and the proportion of workers employed in the creative class 
also has a statistically significant and negative correlation with low earner rates, at -.287. 
For all of these tests, very similar results are seen when using the variable definitions 
which are comparable between 2000 and 1990. 
These results suggest several things. First, these correlation tests lend support to 
hypothesis five in that rates of employment in the new economy is associated with higher 
levels of inequality as measured by the 90/20 earnings ratio and the Gini Coefficient. At 
the same time, rates of employment in the new economy are also associated with reduced 
low earner rates. So, among those workers who are employed in these MSA’s, increases 
in new economy employment would seem to lift some of those workers out of poverty, 
but measures of overall inequality in these regions also increase.  
Also, it should be noted that the correlations are higher for the Gini Coefficient 
than the 90/20 earnings ratio. As explained in Chapter 3, we can think of the Gini 
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Coefficient as an assessment of inequality with an eye towards the middle of the earnings 
distribution, while the 90/20 ratio measures inequality with a greater focus on how the 
earnings distribution is stretched by high-income earners. From this pattern, then, we may 
conclude rates of employment in the new economy is associated with greater inequality 
generally, but particularly, it is associated with income inequality due to having less 
middle-income earners in the region. 
Hypothesis 2C examines correlations between rates of geographic mobility in 
MSA’s with these same indicators of inequality. No statistically significant linear 
correlation is found between rates of geographic mobility and the 90/20earnings ratio. A 
weak positive correlation is found between rates of geographic mobility and the Gini 
coefficient, with a correlation of .170, statistically significant at the .05 level. A very 
comparable correlation is also found between rates of geographic mobility and low earner 
rates. This evidence is inconclusive in regards to the sixth hypothesis. There is some 
weak support for the argument that rates of geographic mobility are associated with 
higher inequality, but it is very weak and inconsistent support.  
5.3 CHANGE OVER TIME  
 Hypothesis 3 examines whether those correlations tested in hypotheses one 
through six are stronger in 2000 than in 1990. To test this hypothesis, we will use the 
definitions for the new economy variables which are comparable between 2000 and 1990. 
Comparing the standard variables with the comparable variables, the results for all of 
these correlations were very similar in 2000, which should assure us that the comparable 
variable definitions will give meaningful results. 
 We can test this hypothesis for the first set of hypotheses by looking at Table 5.1. 
Here we see that the correlation tests between rates of education and new economy 
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employment were slightly stronger in 2000 than in 1990, with all of these correlations 
showing an increase in about .1 in the strength of the correlation. A Fisher Z 
transformation test was conducted for each of these. The Fisher Z transformation test 
makes it possible to determine if the difference in strength between two different 
correlation results from two independent samples is statistically significant (Fisher 1915; 
Howell, 2004). If we set the threshold at the .05 level for statistical significance, then a 
result of less than .05 would mean that the difference in strength between 1990 and 2000 
is statistically significantly different. Using this metric, we can say that the impact of 
rates of educational attainment is significant stronger in 2000 than in 1990, as the results 
of the Fisher Z test are .021 and .036 for rates of at least a Bachelor’s degree, and rates of 
attainment of more than a Bachelor’s degree, respectively. 
The results for this test with rates of new economy employment are more 
complex. The impact of the super-creative core is not significantly different across time. 
Rates of employment in both high-technology industries and creative class occupations 
show a result near the fringe of statistical significance. The impact of employment in 
high-technology industries on median earnings is stronger in 2000 than in 1990, but the 
Fisher Z transformation result shows that that difference has more than a 6-in-100 chance 
of having happened randomly. The difference in the strength of the correlation between 
rates of employment in the creative class and median earnings, however, is shown to be 
statistically significant, with a Fisher Z transformation result of .043, below the .05 
threshold.  
So, here we do find some support for hypothesis 3. Correlations between 
educational attainment and earnings are demonstrated to have grown stronger over time, 
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and the correlation between rates of creative class employment and earnings has grown 
over the decade from 1990 to 2000. 
Moving to Table 5.2, we can test the hypothesis 3 in reference to hypotheses 2A 
through 2C. While Table 5.1 revealed that the correlations tested there had similar, but 
slightly weaker, results, Table 5.2 shows that many of the correlations found to exist in 
2000 by these tests did not exist in 1990. For example, in 1990 there is no statistically 
significant relationship between educational attainment and the 90/20 earnings ratio. The 
correlation between educational attainment and the Gini coefficient is found to exist in 
1990. But, the Fisher Z test confirms that all of these correlations were significantly 
stronger in 2000 than in 1990. In contrast, no evidence is found that the negative 
association between rates of educational attainment and low earner rates differed in 2000 
from 1990. 
The most interesting point at which to test hypothesis 3, though, is in regards to 
hypothesis 2B, and the expectation of a increasingly strong relationship between rates of 
employment in the new economy and the 90/20 earnings ratio and the Gini coefficient. 
As table 5.2 reveals, the correlations between rates of employment in high-technology 
industries and creative class occupations was significantly stronger in 2000 than in 1990. 
In fact, rates of employment in high-technology industries was not associated to the 90/20 
earnings ratio or the Gini coefficient in 1990. The proportion of workers employed in 
creative class occupations was associated with the Gini coefficient in 1990 (with a 
correlation of .323), but, even here the correlation was statistically significant stronger in 
2000 than in 1990. These data points lend substantial support to hypothesis 3.  
The results are different for low earner rates, however, as the strength of the 
correlations between rates of employment in these sectors and low earner rates was not 
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found to be different in 1990 than in 2000. Also, while rates of geographic mobility were 
not strongly associated with inequality in 2000, we do find that it was associated with all 
three indicators of inequality in 1990. However, we note that this change over time was 
only significantly different for the correlation between the rate of geographic mobility 
and the 90/20 earnings ratio. 
5.4 CORRELATIONS WITH MSA-LEVEL SECTORAL CHANGE  
Given the support found for hypothesis 3, we might expect that as cities experience 
increasing rates of employment in the new economy sectors, then those cities should see 
higher earnings and increased inequality. Hypotheses 4A and 4B examine this 
expectation, testing whether changes in rates of employment in the new economy over 
time are associated with higher earnings and higher inequality in those MSA’s. Table 5.3 
reports the results of a series of correlation tests which examined the potential 
associations between changes in rates of employment in new economy sectors between 
1990 and 2000 in MSA’s and earnings and inequality in those MSA’s.  
I find that positive and significant correlations exist between change in 
proportions of workers employed in high-technology, creative class, and super-creative 
core occupations and median earnings. All three of these correlations are statistically 
significant (at the .01 level), and range from .280, to .249, to .205, respectively. Of these 
measures, change in the proportion of workers employed in high-technology industries is 
the most strongly associated with median earnings. These findings lend support to 
hypothesis 4A. 
Moving further down Table 5.3, we see less support for hypothesis 4B. Among all 
of the correlations tested between change in rates of new economy employment and the 
90/20earnings ratio and the Gini coefficient, none of these were found to have a linear 
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correlation. Changes in rates of new economy employment are found to have negative 
correlations with low earner rates, though. Again, rates of high-technology industry 
employment are the strongest correlation, in this instance with a correlation of -.200. 
These findings do not provide support for hypotheses 4A and 4B. 
 In examining change in rates of employment in these sectors over time, these tests 
demonstrate that increases in rates of employment in these industries is associated with 
higher median earnings, but not with high levels of inequality, between 1990 and 2000. 
These increases are also found to be associated with lower low earner rates among those 
who are employed in these MSA’s. Change in rates of employment in high-technology 
industries is found to be the strongest among these correlations. 
5.5 DISCUSSION 
 In the results detailed above there is strong support for many of the hypotheses, 
but little or no support for others. Employment in new economy sectors and higher rates 
of educational attainment are both associated with increases in median earnings, and also 
increases in measures of inequality. Recall from Chapter 3 that the 90 to 20 earnings ratio 
is more sensitive to inequality caused by higher-income earners and the Gini coefficient 
is more sensitive to inequality caused by fluctuations among middle-income earners. 
With this in mind, it is interesting to note that growth in the new economy sectors is more 
strongly associated with the Gini coefficient than the earnings ratio. Rather than driving 
up inequality by stretching out the earnings distributions of labor markets, new economy 
growth seems to increase inequality by having a bi-modal impact on the earnings 
distribution. This supports Florida’s argument that inequality in the new economy is 
caused by interdependence between high-paying new economy jobs and lower paying 
service class jobs, and it aligns with expectations from the new structuralists. 
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While inequality appears to be positively associated with these factors, low earner 
rates are found to be negatively associated with the same factors. This suggests that while 
inequality is growing, it grows despite a reduction in the low earner rate. The reader 
should keep in mind, though, that these low earner rates are based on a sample of 
employed individuals only. So, growth in new economy sectors moves employed people 
out of poverty, but we have no evidence here for what it means for those who are 
unemployed or working in informal economies. 
Little evidence is found that rates of geographic mobility play the expected role. 
This may be because the variable used to measure geographic mobility is less than ideal. 
This variable is based on a variable which only measures if a person lived in the same 
MSA five years prior, so it is a very limited window on geographic mobility.  
 This examination does find strong evidence that these relationships are growing 
stronger over time. This suggests that the new economy is becoming a more important 
force in urban regions. While this does not lend direct support to Florida’s causal 
argument that the creative class is the economic drivers in the modern economy, it does 
suggest that the presence of the creative class is, over time, becoming a more important 
factor in earnings and inequality at the metropolitan area level.  
 These findings suggest important new questions, especially about how these 





Table 5.1 MSA-Level Correlation Analyses Results for Median Earnings 
 
 2000Γ 2000+ 1990+ 
Fisher 
Z Test 
Education     
% Bachelors or More & Median Earnings - .687** .553** .021 
% More than Bachelors & Median Earnings - .597** .454** .036 
New Economy     
% High-Tech & Median Earnings .669** .651** .538** .064 
% Creative Class & Median Earnings .665** .661** .539** .043 
% Super-Creative Core & Median Earnings .502** .384** .279** .215 
Geographic Mobility     
% Geographically Mobile & Median Earnings - -.041 -.052 .905 
Γ using the 2000 standard definitions, rather than comparable to 1990 definitions 
+Using the 1990-comparable variables  
* Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed) 





Table 5.2 MSA-Level Correlation Analyses Results for Inequality Indicators 
 2000Γ 2000+ 1990+ 
Fisher Z 
Test 
Education     
% Bachelors or More & 90/20 - .338** .048 .001 
% Bachelors or More & Gini - .523** .265** .001 
% Bachelors or More & % Low Earner - -.342** -.251** .293 
% More than Bachelors & 90/20 - .361** .041 .000 
% More than Bachelors & Gini - .487** .205** .001 
% More than Bachelors & % Low Earner - -.252** -.197** .542 
New Economy     
% High-Tech & 90/20 .247** .269** -.049 .000 
% High-Tech & Gini .338** .353** .033 .000 
% High-Tech & % Low Earner -.427** -.386** -.304** .326 
% Creative Class & 90/20 .345** .381** .083 .000 
% Creative Class & Gini .559** .584** .323** .000 
% Creative Class & Low Earner -.287** -.267** -.214** .555 
% Super-Creative Core & 90/20 .217** .227** .300** .407 
% Super-Creative Core & Gini .386** .380** .320** .472 
% Super-Creative Core & Low Earner -.131* -.017 .045 .516 
Geographic Mobility     
% Geographically Mobile & 90/20 - -.010 .227** .011 
% Geographically Mobile & Gini - .170* .316** .101 
% Geographically Mobile & % Low Earner  .156* .139* .857 
Γ using the 2000 standard definitions, rather than comparable to 1990 definitions 
+Using the 1990-comparable variables 
* Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed) 





Table 5.3 MSA-Level Correlation Analyses Results for Change over time 
 r 
Earnings  
Change in % High-Tech & Median Earnings .280** 
Change in % Creative Class & Median Earnings .249** 
Change in % Super-Creative Core & Median Earnings .205** 
Inequality  
Change in % High-Tech & 90/20 .075 
Change in % High-Tech & Gini .101 
Change in % High-Tech & % Low Earner -.200** 
Change in % Creative Class & 90/20 .106 
Change in % Creative Class & Gini .068 
Change in % Creative Class & % Low Earner -.185** 
Change in % Super-Creative Core & 90/20 -.020 
Change in % Super-Creative Core & Gini -.006 






INDIVIDUAL WORKERS IN AN UNEQUAL LANDSCAPE: VARIATIONS IN 
EARNINGS ACROSS MSAS 
This chapter will examine what factors contribute to how an individual’s earnings 
vary across MSA’s. Human capital, measured here through educational, as well as 
employment in high-technology industries, and employment in creative class occupations 
has a positive relationship with individual earnings. These relationships vary across 
metropolitan areas based on characteristics of those metropolitan areas. This chapter will 
examine how the impact of individual educational attainment varies across MSA’s based 
on those characteristics. The hypotheses driving this investigation were delineated in 
Chapter 2 and the data and methods of analysis were elaborated in Chapter 3. 
6.1 ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
Because the distribution of earnings in the sample was skewed, the following 
models were estimated using the natural log of earnings. Each of the models discussed in 
this paper model the natural log of earnings. An unconditional model, with no predictors 
included, was created for the outcome variable. This model revealed that the earnings 
differed significantly between MSA’s, which was indicated by the individual-level model 
intercept having a p-value of <.001. For this unconditional model, the interclass 
correlation coefficient reports that 2.6% of the variation in earnings can be explained at 
the aggregate level. By subtracting this value from 100%, this calculation also implies 
that 97.4% of the variation in earnings may be explained by individual-level factors. 
Individual characteristics are a major predictor of individual earnings, but some processes 
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impacting individual earnings do operate through the MSA-level, and the focus in this 
examination is on how the impact of individual-level factors are impact by characteristics 
of the individual’s MSA. The reliability of the unconditional model was .991which is 
particularly high. 
 Next, an analysis was conducted to determine a strong individual-level model. 
First, a model was created allowing each of the individual-level factors to vary randomly 
across MSA’s. All of the factors except employment in the government were significant 
at the p<.001 level, which means it could be of interest to continue to allow all of these 
variables to vary randomly in subsequent models. Because the focus of this examination 
is on educational attainment, employment in high-technology industries, and employment 
in creative class occupations, the control variable factors were included as fixed effects in 
subsequent models in order to avoid jeopardizing the stability of subsequent models. 
With the individual-level factors set, a revised individual-level model was estimated with 
only the education and employment sector variables varying randomly across MSA’s. 
Allowing these three educational attainment factors to vary randomly, it is possible later 
to look for explanations for why and how these factors vary randomly across MSA’s by 
examining the cross-level interaction effects between these factors and the MSA-level 
predictors. In this final level-1 model, the reliability estimates were strong (> .75) for all 
three randomly varying factors. In this model the coefficients for nearly all of the factors 
in the model were significant at the p <.001 level (excluding only government 
employment). The results of the final level-1 model are reported in Table 6.1, and all 
tables in this chapter are placed at the end of the chapter. 
In this model, each of the factors considered are significantly associated with 
individual earnings, except for employment in government. As expected, the relationship 
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between individual educational attainment, high-technology employment, and creative 
class employment, and earnings varies significantly across MSA’s. Factors such as age, 
being married, having children, along with weeks and hours worked are all positively 
associated with earnings as expected from theory and previous work (Huffman and 
Cohen, 2004). Being geographically mobile (in this sample, this means having relocated 
within the previous five years) has a weak but significant positive relationship on 
individual earnings. Meanwhile, controlling for all other factors, being a minority race is 
negatively associated with earnings in this model.  
The next step in this study then, is to estimate both the individual-level and MSA-
level main effects. To do this, a level-2 (or MSA-level) model was estimated with all 
individual-level factors as fixed effects except for the educational attainment, high-
technology employment, and creative class employment variable, which were found to 
vary strongly across MSA’s, and the several MSA-level factors of interest. This model is 
also reported in Table 6.1. 
 In this model with both individual- and MSA-level factors, several MSA-level 
factors were found to have statistically significant impacts on individual earnings. The 
percentage of workers in an MSA with at least a college degree, as well as the percentage 
of workers that were married, had children, employed by the government or non-profit 
organization, low earner, or in the creative class, all have a statistically significant impact 
on individual earnings. The percentage of Blacks in the workforce did not have a 
significant impact on earnings, but the percentage of Hispanics or other race individuals 
did have a statistically significant impact. Comparing the coefficients of individual-level 
factors between this model and the final level-1 model, there is very little change, but the 
standard errors on nearly every factor improved in this model.  
 95 
Because the major research endeavor in this study is explaining the across-MSA 
variation of the impact of education on individual’s earnings, the next model that 
examines individual and MSA level factors as well as cross-level interactions. This 
model includes all of the previously discussed individual-level and MSA-level variables, 
but also includes cross-level interactions of the two MSA-level variables on the 
individual-level factors which varied significantly across MSA’s. The results of this 
model are reported in Table 6.2.  
In this final model, all of the non-interacted individual level and MSA-level 
factors report little change in coefficients or significance from Models 1 and 2. The 
direction of the effect of factors of interest are as expected, with  age, geographic 
mobility, being male, married, and having children, as well as being a government 
employee all being positively associated with earnings. Conversely, being non-white is 
associated lower earnings, as is working less than 40 hours per week, less than half of the 
weeks that year, being a non-profit employee. At the MSA level, the strongest impact on 
individual earnings is the percentage of low earning workers. The percentage of Black 
workers is not statistically significant, but the proportion of Hispanic and other race 
workers is significant. The Gini coefficient does not have a significant impact, nor does 
the percentage of high-technology industries workers have a direct impact on individual 
earnings. The proportion of workers with children does have a significant and positive 
impact on individual earnings, but the proportion of married individuals in an MSA has a 
significant negative impact on individual earnings. Perhaps this second point corresponds 
with Florida (2012) and Moretti’s (2012) arguments that the creative class or innovation 
workers rely on social interaction to stimulate their innovation, and as the proportion of 
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workers in an MSA who are married increases, that sort of social interaction is 
suppressed. 
First, let’s consider whether this final model lends support to the hypotheses 
delineated in Chapter 2. The first set of hypotheses tested in this chapter’s analysis 
examines the individual-level. Hypothesis 5A expected that individual earnings would 
vary across MSA’s in a statistically significant way, and the models elaborated here 
demonstrate substantial support for that hypothesis. Hypothesis 5B contended that 
holding a college degree or more would be associated with increased individual earnings, 
and the models elaborated here also support this hypothesis. Specifically, holding at least 
a college degree is associated with a 29% increase in individual earnings, controlling for 
all other factors. Hypothesis 5C anticipated that being employed in a high-technology 
industry would be associated with increased individual earnings, and support for this was 
also found. Being employed in a high-technology industry is associated with a 15% 
increase in earnings, controlling for all other factors. Hypothesis 5D expected that being 
employed in a creative class occupation would be associated with increased individual 
earnings, and it is, as the models show a 29% increase in earnings being associated with 
having a job in this occupational category. 
Next, let’s look at the tests for support of the set of hypothesis that examine the 
MSA-level. While each of the independent variables investigated here is considered in 
the examination of cross-level interaction effects, these hypotheses each anticipate that 
these factors will also function as predictors of earning on their own at the MSA level. 
Hypothesis 6A expects that an increase in the percentage of workers with a college 
degree in a worker’s MSA will be associated with an increase in their individual 
earnings. As we see from the final model in Table 6.2, each percentage increase in the 
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proportion of workers with at least a Bachelor’s degree is associated with a .61% increase 
in individual earnings, controlling for all other factors. Hypothesis 6B argued that an 
increase in the percentage of workers employed in high-technology industries would be 
associated with an increase in their individual earnings. Support was not found for this 
hypothesis, as the percentage of workers employed in high-technology industries did not 
have a statistically significant association with individual earnings in the final model. 
Hypothesis 6C expects that an increase in the percentage of workers employed in creative 
class occupations in a worker’s MSA will be associated with an increase in their 
individual earnings. Support was found for this hypothesis, as each percentage increase in 
the proportion of workers employed in creative class occupations in a person’s MSA is 
associated with a .34% increase in earnings. This finding was only marginally significant, 
though, at the .05 level. 
Of particular interest in this final model, though, is what we may learn from the 
examination of the cross-level interactions effects in this model. The effects of these 
cross-level interactions are predicted by hypotheses 7A through 9C. Recall that in earlier 
models the effect of having at least a Bachelor’s degree (compared to having less than a 
Bachelor’s degree) on earnings is positive, and the effect of this variable was found to 
vary randomly across MSA’s. This is also true for the effect on individual earnings of 
being employed in high-technology industries and being employed in creative class 
occupations. The cross-level interaction model is used to investigate how the effect of 
each of these three variables earnings changes across MSA’s, based on the MSA-level 
characteristics that are interacted with them.  
First, we examine the cross-level interactions on the individual holding a 
bachelor’s degree or more. In this final model, holding at least a Bachelor’s degree is 
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associated with a 29% increase in earnings, for an individual, but that relationship 
changes based on some MSA-level characteristics. Hypothesis 7A expects that the 
proportion of workers with a college degree in a worker’s MSA will have a negative 
effect on the relationship between individual educational attainment and earnings. From 
the final model, we see that as the proportion of individuals holding at least a Bachelor’s 
degree increases the value of an individual’s college degree decreases. This supports 
hypothesis 7A. Specifically, each percentage increase in the proportion of workers 
holding at least a Bachelor’s degree in a worker’s MSA reduces the impact of holding at 
least a college degree on their earnings of .49%. Hypothesis 7B expects that the 
proportion of workers employed in high-technology industries in a worker’s MSA 
reduces the positive relationship between individual educational attainment and earnings. 
In this final model, the proportion of people employed in high-technology industries does 
not have a significant cross-level impact on the relationship between an individual’s 
educational attainment and their earnings, so no support is found for hypothesis nine. 
Hypothesis 7C anticipates that the proportion of workers employed in creative class 
occupations in a worker’s MSA reduces the relationship between individual educational 
attainment and earnings. The final model shows that as the proportion of people 
employed in creative class occupations increases, the value to an individual of their 
college degree increases. Specifically, each percentage increase in the proportion of 
workers employed in creative class occupations in a worker’s MSA is associated with an 
increase in the impact of holding at least a college degree on their earnings of .48%. So, 
here we see evidence of the queuing effect – a higher education becomes less valuable to 
a worker as they compete in a labor market with an increasing proportion of workers with 
higher educations. This supports hypothesis 7C and the contention that the proportion of 
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workers employed in the creative class has a meaningful and positive impact on 
individual earnings.  
Next, I investigate the cross-level interactions on the individual-level relationship 
between being employed in high-technology industries and individual earnings. 
Examining the cross-level model, I find that for an individual, being employed in a high-
technology industry is associated with a 15% increase in earnings, but that relationship 
varies based on the MSA-level characteristics which interact with it. Hypothesis 8A 
contends that the proportion of workers with a college degree in a worker’s MSA will 
have a negative effect on the relationship between being employed in a high-technology 
industry and earnings. As the proportion of individuals holding at least a Bachelor’s 
degree increases in that worker’s MSA, the value of being employed in a high-technology 
industry decreases. Specifically, each percentage increase in the proportion of workers 
holding at least a Bachelor’s degree in a worker’s MSA is associated with a decrease in 
the impact of being employed in a high-technology industry on their earnings of .82%. 
This provides support for hypothesis 8A.  
What about the cross-level impact of rates of employment in high-technology 
industries on the relationship between an individual’s employment in that industry and 
their earnings? Hypothesis 8B expects that the proportion of workers employed in high-
technology industries in a worker’s MSA will strengthen the relationship between being 
employed in a high-technology industry and earnings. From this model, we observe that 
as the proportion of individuals employed in high-technology industries in that worker’s 
MSA increases, the value of being employed in a high-technology industry also 
increases. Specifically, each percentage increase in the proportion of workers employed 
in a high-technology industry in a worker’s MSA is associated with an increase in the 
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impact of being employed in a high-technology industry on their earnings of .69%. This 
provides direct support for hypothesis 8B and Moretti’s (2012) argument on the 
“clustering effect” of innovation workers, if they are understood to be high-technology 
workers.  
Hypothesis 8C expects that the proportion of workers employed in creative class 
occupations in a worker’s MSA will have a positive effect on the relationship between 
being employed in high-technology industries and earnings. I also find evidence 
supporting this hypothesis, because in the final model we see that as the proportion of 
people employed in creative class occupations increases, the value to an individual of 
being employed in a high-technology industry also increases. Specifically, each 
percentage increase in the proportion of workers employed in creative class occupations 
in a worker’s MSA is associated with a .98% increase in the impact of being employed in 
a high-technology industry on earnings. Here there is evidence of what we might call a 
“spillover effect” – if a person works in a high-technology industry, their earnings are 
improved by increases in rates of employment in both high-technology industries and in 
creative class occupations. 
As for the next set of cross-level interactions, we see that for an individual, being 
employed in a creative class occupation is associated with a 29% increase in earnings. 
But does this relationship vary based on the cross-level impacts of MSA-level 
characteristics? Examining the cross-level interactions, we find that this relationship is 
not significantly modified by any of these three cross-level interactions. Therefore, we 
find no evidence in support of hypotheses 9A, 9B, or 9C. The proportion of individuals 
with a at least a college degree, employed in high-technology industries, or employed in 
creative class occupations, does not have a significant cross-level impact on the increased 
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earnings an individual receives in working in a creative class occupation. For an 
individual, the value of working in a creative class occupation does not change based on 
these MSA-level characteristics. 
Examining the final cross-level model, I found support for most of the hypotheses 
delineated in this chapter. Individual educational attainment and employment in either 
high-technology industries or creative class occupations are all associated with increased 
earnings. Also, the relationships between an individual’s educational attainment and their 
earnings, and employment in high-technology industries and earnings, are both 
significantly impacted by cross-level factors. The impact of being employed in a creative 
class occupation on earnings, however, is not impacted by these cross-level factors.  
In this study, estimated models of earnings demonstrate that the value of a higher 
degree, and employment in either high-technology industries or creative class 
occupations, varies significantly across MSA’s. In working to account for this variation, 
this investigation found several things. First, the positive association between higher 
education and earnings is strengthened as the proportion of individuals employed in the 
creative class, but not in high-technology industries, increases. At the same time, the 
positive association between education attainment and earnings is reduced by increasing 
rates of educational attainment in a worker’s MSA. Next, the positive association 
between employment in high-technology industries and earnings is strengthened by both 
the proportion of workers working in high-technology industries and creative class 
occupations, but it is reduced by the proportion of workers with at least a college degree. 
Finally, while there is a positive relationship between an individual’s employment in a 
creative class occupation and their earnings, this relationship is not impacted by any of 
these three cross-level factors. 
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 These findings support both theoretical arguments explored in this chapter. A 
queuing effect exists in the new urban economy, where the value of an individual’s 
higher education is reduced by the presence of other workers with a higher education in 
their MSA. At the same time, clustering effects do emerge. Moretti’s (2012) argument for 
a clustering effect finds support as workers in high-technology occupations see increased 
earnings as the proportion of creative class and high-technology workers increases in 
their MSA’s. While Florida (2002) was one of the first to argue that in this new economy, 
where you work matters more, not less, this evidence shows that for those in the creative 
class, the presence of creative class workers in their MSA has no discernible effect on 



















TABLE 6.1. Models 1 and 2: Level-1 and Level-1 and 2 Models of Earnings (Ln) 
 
  
Model 1   
Individual-Level  
Model 2 
Individual and MSA Level 




Intercept  10.17** 0.01 10.17** 0.00 
Education Variables      
   Bachelor’s Degree or Morea  0.29** 0.00 0.29** 0.00 
Work Variables      
   High-Technology Industry  0.15** 0.01 0.15** 0.01 
   Creative Class Occupation  0.29** 0.00 0.29** 0.00 
   Worked less than 40 hrs/week  -0.68** 0.02 -0.68** 0.02 
   Worked 26 weeks or less  -1.27** 0.01 -1.27** 0.01 
   Government Employee
b
  0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 
   Non-profit Employee
b
  -0.10** 0.00 -0.10 0.00 
Geographically Mobile  0.02** 0.00 -0.04** 0.00 
Race
c
      
   Black  -0.12** 0.01 -0.12** 0.01 
   Hispanic  -0.21** 0.02 -0.28** 0.02 
   Other  -0.13** 0.02 -0.21** 0.01 
Age  0.01** 0.00 0.01** 0.00 
Male  0.29** 0.00 0.29** 0.01 
Family Variables      
   Married  0.08** 0.00 0.08** 0.00 
   One or More Children in Home  0.06** 0.00 0.06** 0.00 




Percent Bachelor’s or More  - - 0.62** 0.14 
Percent High-Technology 
Industry 
 - - 0.09 0.10 
Percent Creative Class 
Occupation 
 - - 0.33 0.20 
Percent Geographically Mobile  - - -0.17 0.09 
Percent Low Earner  - - -5.28** 0.48 
Gini Coefficient  - - 0.45 0.25 
Percent Employed in non-profit  - - -0.53* 0.17 
Percent Employed in Government  - - -0.31* 0.11 
Percent Married  - - -0.68** 0.16 
Percent One or More Children  - - 0.85** 0.16 
Percent Black  - - 0.07 0.05 
Percent Hispanic  - - 0.15 0.06 
Percent Other Race  - - 0.49** 0.15 
TABLE 6.1 CONTINUED BELOW 








   
TABLE 6.1 CONTINUED   
Variance Components Level-1 Model Level-1 and -2 Model 




Intercept 0.02002** 224 0.00204** 210 
Bachelor’s or More 0.00214** 224 0.00207** 224 
High-Technology Industry 0.00393** 224 0.00394** 224 
Creative Class Occupation 0.00143** 224 0.00143** 224 
Estimation with Robust Standard Errors reported 
a Coefficients in italics vary randomly across MSA’s. 
b 
reference category is employed in private sector 
c 
reference category is white, non-Hispanic 




Table 6.2. Model 3: Cross-Level Model of Earnings (Ln) 
 
Cross-Level Interactions  Coefficient Se   
Bachelor’s Degree or More  0.29** 0.00   
      by MSA %  Bachelor’s or More  -0.49* 0.15   
      by MSA Percent High-Tech  0.07 0.09   
      by MSA Percent Creative Class  0.48* 0.17   
High-Technology Industry  0.15** 0.01   
      by MSA %  Bachelor’s or More  -0.82** 0.18   
      by MSA Percent High-Tech  0.69** 0.13   
      by MSA Percent Creative Class  0.98** 0.20   
Creative Class Occupation  0.29** 0.00   
      by MSA %  Bachelor’s or More  0.08 0.14   
      by MSA Percent High-Tech  0.06 0.08   
      by MSA Percent Creative Class  0.16 0.17   
Individual-Level Factors  Coefficient Se   
Work Variables      
   Worked less than 40 hrs/week  -0.68** 0.02   
   Worked 26 weeks or less  -1.27** 0.00   
   Government Employee
a
  0.02 0.01   
   Non-profit Employee
a
  -0.10** 0.01   
Geographically Mobile  0.02** 0.02   
Race
b
      
   Black  -0.12** 0.00   
   Hispanic  -0.28** 0.02   
   Other  -0.21** 0.02   
Age  0.04** 0.00   
Male  0.29** 0.01   
Family Variables      
   Married  0.08** 0.00   
   One or More Children in Home  0.06** 0.00   
MSA-Level Factors  Coefficient sea   
Percent Bachelor’s or More  0.61** 0.14   
Percent High-Technology   0.05 0.09   
Percent Creative Class   0.34 0.20   
Percent Geographically Mobile  -0.17 0.09   
Percent Low Earner  -5.31** 0.48   
Gini Coefficient  0.46 0.00   
Percent Employed in non-profit  -0.53* 0.17   
Percent Employed in Government  -0.32* 0.11   
Percent Married  -0.68** 0.16   
Percent One or More Children  0.85** 0.16   
Percent Black  0.07 0.05   
Percent Hispanic  0.15 0.06   
Percent Other Race  0.49** 0.15   
TABLE 6.2 CONTINUED BELOW   
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TABLE 6.2 CONTINUED   
Variance Components Cross-Level Model  
Random Effect Variance Component Df   
Intercept 0.00203** 210   
Bachelor’s Degree or More 0.00207** 221   
Creative Class Occupations 0.00114** 221   
High-Technology Industries 0.00250** 221   
Robust Standard Errors reported 
a
 reference category is employed in private sector 
b
 reference category is white, non-Hispanic 











The rise of the new urban economy has been associated with dramatic changes for 
earnings opportunities for workers in regional labor markets. These changes have meant 
increased inequality both between MSA’s and within MSA’s. MSA’s with higher rates of 
employment in new economy sectors see higher earnings, and increased inequality. For 
wage earning individuals in this uneven geography, their earnings are shaped not only by 
their own characteristics, but also by characteristics of their MSA. 
In this new urban economy, the social structures of place and inequality emerge as 
major factors in determining an individual’s earnings opportunities. One of the major 
contributions of the scholars of the new urban economy is a renewed emphasis on how 
social structures shape individual opportunity. While educational attainment has emerged 
as a strong factor in individual earnings, social structures including the characteristics of 
the region that a person works in area also major factors in shaping a worker’s 
opportunities. 
In Chapter 4 we saw how both inequality in earnings within MSA’s and 
inequality in median earnings between MSA’s had grown in the decade from 1990 to 
2000. We also saw that inequality between MSA’s in the proportions of workers 
employed in new economy industries and occupations had grown during this decade. 
With these structural shifts taking place, of course these structures will exert some 
influence over individual earning opportunities. 
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In Chapter 5 we saw much evidence supporting hypotheses derived from the new 
urban economy literature about how MSA-level characteristics are associated. For 
MSA’s, the proportion of workers employed in new economy sectors is associated with 
both higher earnings and with increases in inequality. Increasing presence of new 
economy employment does seem to reduce low earner rates as it lifts employed workers 
out of poverty. Even in cities with high proportions of new economy employment, 
though, workers at the bottom of the earnings distribution, however, find themselves in 
increasingly unequal MSA’s. As labor markets see rates of employment in new economy 
sectors increase, the structure of their employment opportunities are becoming more bi-
modal. Even among those who are finding work, there is a division between those with 
“good” jobs in the new economy, and those who are working in (typically) service sector 
jobs supporting the growing sectors. 
Reflecting on the results of the final cross-level model in the previous chapter, 
this study finds support for many of the hypotheses delineated for this portion of the 
study as well. I found that individual educational attainment and employment in either 
high-technology industries or creative class occupations are all associated with increased 
earnings. We also see that the relationships between an individual’s educational 
attainment and their earnings, and employment in high-technology industries and 
earnings, are both significantly impacted by cross-level factors. The impact of being 
employed in a creative class occupation on earnings, however, is not impacted by these 
cross-level factors. 
These findings support the argument that the value of a higher degree towards 
improving an individual’s earnings varies significantly based on the characteristics of  
 109 
labor market in which the individual is working. The same is true for the value of 
working in a high-technology industry.  
What is interesting here is that we see strong, consistent evidence in support of 
queuing theory. Competing for work in labor markets where many other workers have a 
higher degree, suppresses the impact of an individual’s higher degree on their earnings. 
This suggests that even in an innovation economy, laws of suppy and demand, or the 
queuing effect, will cause a reduction in the value of skills as a result of competition 
among fellow skilled workers.. This also suggests that while clustering effects may be 
real (more on this below), the clustering effect does not work through the clustering of 
highly educated workers. This evidence should not suggest to readers, however, that 
educational attainment does not play an important role in an individual’s earnings. The 
opposite is the case. An individual’s educational attainment does play a very large role in 
an individual’s earnings. Especially in this new urban economy, increasing your 
educational attainment is one of the most direct means by which to increase your 
earnings. 
What is the role of employment in high-technology industries? For an individual, 
being employed in the high-technology industry is associated with higher earnings. But 
also, working in an MSA with a higher proportion of workers employed in high-
technology industries also increases your earnings. Here we see evidence for Moretti’s 
(2012) “clustering effect.” While the strength of this relationship is reduced as the 
proportion of college educated workers increases, the higher the proportion of workers in 
high-technology industries in your MSA, the higher your earnings are likely to be. So, 
employment in high-technology industries is a driver of higher earnings. 
 110 
Employment in the creative class also plays an interesting role. Being employed 
in the creative class is associated with higher earnings. This relationship is not impacted 
by the cross-level effects examined here. Rates of employment in the creative class, 
however, do enhance the positive relationship between both individual education 
attainment and earnings and individual employment in high-technology industries and 
earnings. From this perspective we see that Florida gets at least part of the argument 
about the creative class correct – individuals with a college degree and individuals 
working in high-technology industries all benefit when there are more creative class 
workers around. Unfortunately for creative class members, they would not see their 
earnings increase by increasing the numbers of their class’s ranks in their local MSA. 
 This study also demonstrates how both the high-technology industry employment 
and creative class occupation employment are independently useful indicators of the new 
urban economy. As Florida (2012) goes at length to demonstrate, the creative class is not 
a monolith. It is comprised of people working in a variety of occupations, with a wide 
range of training and skills, and with a wide range of earnings. Despite the diversity of its 
membership, though, MSA-level rates of employment in this class of occupations is 
highly correlated with MSA-level indicators of inequality. But the creative class is not the 
only useful measure of the new economy, as the high-technology industry employment 
measures applied in this study demonstrate equally interesting patterns. Both categories 
function independently as structural forces in local MSA’s. While the positive impact on 
individual earnings from employment in the creative class is not altered by the proportion 
of workers in the creative class or in high-technology industries in their MSA, the 
positive impact on an individual earnings associated with being employed in a high-
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technology industry is increased as rates of employment in creative class occupations and 
high-technology industries increase in their MSA.  
In this new economy, the characteristics of workers’ MSAs unequally structure 
earnings opportunities. As the rate of employment in new economy sectors increases in a 
worker’s MSA, their earnings may be expected to increase. These patterns also 
emphasize how work opportunities in regional labor markets are becoming increasingly 
split. Working in either a creative class occupation or a high-technology industry is 
associated with much higher earnings, on average, leaving those not employed in new 
economy sectors with more challenging outlook to increase their earnings. As earnings 
becomes increasingly positively associated with employment in either of these two new 
economy sectors, those who are unable to find work in these sectors are increasingly 
pushed toward work that supports these sectors and pays less well. 
Emphasizing this structural perspective is an important contribution of this 
research. Like Mills (1959), we must recognize that the opportunities available to 
workers are structured by their situation. It’s not only their own skills and trainings that 
are important, but also where they work and the characteristics of that place. The new 
urban economy is a social structure which has re-shaped metropolitan regions, and also 
works across and within metropolitan regions to shape individual earnings. 
Some weaknesses of this study should be noted. Some variables are not present in 
the model which likely would have improved the final model. For example a measure of 
cost of living in each MSA would have been a great addition to the model, but was not 
available for the data set used. Some of the impact in range of costs of living across 
MSA’s is controlled for by including low earner rates and the Gini coefficient as a 
measure of inequality, but a clear cut measure of cost of living would have improved the 
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model, as cost of living likely has a substantial impact on earnings. Another weakness to 
consider is what is not available from the variables at hand. For example, there is no 
measure of the diversity of each worker’s social network. There is also no measure of 
what kind of institution their higher degrees are from, or if the disciplines of those 
degrees match the workers’ fields of employment.  
An important limitation of this study is that it examines only employed 
individuals within MSA’s. As Sassen (2012) and others demonstrate, the informal 
economy is an increasingly relevant area of study in understanding urban economic 
dynamics. The informal economy, however, could not be brought within the scope of this 
study. Another weakness is that the data used here is more than a decade old. The new 
economy had established itself in the modern urban economy by 2000, but it will be great 
to have access to the equivalent 2010 census data when it becomes available.  
A related limitation is that self-employed individuals are not included in the 
sample in this study. While self-employed workers are certainly competing with others in 
their labor markets to earn income, their employment is not subject to the same 
marketplace forces as those competing in the traditional labor market. It is true, though, 
that a relatively high proportion of creative class and high-technology workers are self-
employed. So, excluding self-employed earners from the sample reduces representation 
of workers doing creative or high-technology work. Further, excluding self-employed 
individuals may stabilize the data some, as self-employment is often associated with wide 
annual variations in earnings. 
Also, there are two important factors which deserve more in-depth scrutiny in 
future studies: gender and race/ethnicity. Both of these variables were examined as 
control variables in this study, but future work should do more. We know that both play a 
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very interesting role in an individual’s earnings. Also, a variety of interesting dynamics 
related to each of these variables are playing out in the new urban economy. The 2008 
recession disproportionately affected employment in particular sectors of the economy, 
and the gender and racial makeup of employment in those sectors were not balanced. 
This implies that the recession likely had a disproportionate effect on certain gender and 
racial categories through MSA-level structures. Future studies should explore how the 
impact of each of these factors varies across MSA’s 
The new urban economy has created an uneven geography of opportunity for  
workers across the US. The influence of social structures on individual opportunities has 
re-emerged as major determinants of individual earnings. For individuals, earning a 
higher degree, and finding work in either a high-technology industry, or creative class 
occupation, or both, are strong strategies for increasing your individual income. But, the 
individual might be tempted not to encourage their peers to pursue a higher degree, so 
that they will then face less competition on the labor market. For political and economic 
leaders of metropolitan regions who are looking to increase earnings for workers in their 
labor market, there is a real dilemma. Popular wisdom holds that increasing the human 
capital in a metropolitan region will attract high-technology industries and creative class 
occupations, thereby increasing earnings across the labor market. While this is a strategy 
for growth in a metropolitan region, the positive effect of attracting such jobs in the long 
term, may be undercut in the short term as individuals with high human capital compete 
over jobs and see associated reductions in their earnings 
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